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Summary 
We examine the motives for and consequences of 5,317 failed and completed cross-border 
acquisitions constituting $619 billion of total activity that were led by government-
controlled acquirers over the period from 1990 to 2008. We benchmark this activity at the 
aggregate country level and also at the deal level with cross-border acquisitions involving 
corporate acquirers over the same period. We find that government-led deal activity is 
relatively more intense for geographically-closer countries, but also relatively less sensitive 
to differences in the level of economic development of the acquirer’s and target’s home 
countries, in the quality of their legal institutions and accounting standards, and to how 
stringent are restrictions on FDI flows in their countries. Government-led acquirers are 
more likely to pursue larger targets with greater growth opportunities and more financial 
constraints. But, the share-price reactions to the announcements of such acquisitions are 
not different. Among those deals involving government-controlled acquirers, we do find 
important differences involving sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). SWF-led acquisitions are 
less likely to fail, they are more likely to pursue acquirers that are larger in total assets and 
with fewer financial constraints, and the market reactions to SWF-led acquisitions, while 
positive, are statistically and economically much smaller. We discuss policy implications in 
terms of recent regulatory changes in the U.S. and other countries that seek to restrict 
foreign acquisitions by government-controlled entities. 
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We  examine  the  motives  for  and  consequences  of  5,317  failed  and  completed  cross-border  acquisitions 
constituting $619 billion of total activity that were led by government-controlled acquirers over the period from 
1990 to 2008. We benchmark this activity at the aggregate country level and also at the deal level with cross-
border acquisitions involving corporate acquirers over the same period. We find that government-led deal activity 
is relatively more intense for geographically-closer countries, but also relatively less sensitive to differences in the 
level  of  economic  development  of  the  acquirer’s  and  target’s  home  countries,  in  the  quality  of  their  legal 
institutions  and  accounting  standards,  and  to  how  stringent  are  restrictions  on  FDI  flows  in  their  countries. 
Government-led acquirers are more likely to pursue larger targets with greater growth opportunities and more 
financial constraints. But, the share-price reactions to the announcements of such acquisitions are not different. 
Among  those  deals  involving  government-controlled  acquirers,  we  do  find  important  differences  involving 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). SWF-led acquisitions are less likely to fail, they are more likely to pursue 
acquirers that are larger in total assets and with fewer financial constraints, and the market reactions to SWF-led 
acquisitions, while positive, are statistically and economically much smaller. We discuss policy implications in 




   1 
“A signal event of the past quarter-century has been the sharp decline in the extent of direct state ownership of 
business  as  the  private  sector  has  taken  ownership  of  what  were  once  government-owned  companies.  Yet 
governments are now accumulating various kinds of stakes in what were once purely private companies through 
their  cross-border  investment  activities…Governments  are  very  different  from  other  economic  actors.  Their 
investments should be governed by rules designed with that reality very clearly in mind.” 
                    
                   Lawrence Summers, July 30, 2007
1 
 
1.  Introduction 
The significant  and  growing  participation  of  government-controlled  firms  in  the  market  for  cross-border 
acquisitions has drawn much attention in the media. Prominent deals include the failed $19.5 billion investment 
(18% stake) by Chinalco, China’s state-owned metals group, in Rio Tinto, the U.K. and Australian dual-listed 
mining company, in 2009 and the acquisition attempt by Dubai World Ports, a ports management company owned 
by  the  government  of the  United  Arab  Emirates  (UAE)  to acquire  Peninsular  &  Oriental  Steam  Navigation 
Company for $6.8 billion in 2006. Though some of the largest deals involving sovereign acquirers gaining the 
most attention did indeed fail, many have been successfully completed. During the two years 2007-2008 alone, 
over $230 billion across 886 cross-border mergers and acquisition deals (with at least a 5% stake in the target 
company) involved a government-controlled entity as acquirer and this activity comprised more than 10% of the 
total (constant dollar) value of all cross-border acquisitions during this period (see Figure 1 from Securities Data 
Company) and more than one-third of the total of all government-led acquisitions initiated over the period from 
1980 through 2008. Some sovereign acquirers involve large sovereign wealth funds, like the Abu Dhabi and 
Kuwaiti Investment Authority, Singapore’s Temasek Holdings and the China Investment Corporation, but the vast 
majority of the deals involve state-controlled corporations and agencies, like Malaysia’s Petronas ($2.5 billion 
acquisition of Australia’s Santos in 2008) and Sweden’s Vattenfall AB ($600 million purchase of Poland’s Grupa 
Energetyczna in 2008). 
There are serious and growing concerns about the expanded role of governments in global capital markets in 
general, of foreign block acquisitions (minority and majority stakes) led by government agencies in particular, and 
financial economists have devoted relatively little  attention to their study. The main goal of this paper is to 
remedy this deficiency with a comprehensive global study of government-led cross-border acquisitions over the 
past two decades.  We seek answers to the following specific questions. Do government-controlled acquirers 
pursue targets domiciled in countries that differ from cross-border acquisitions led by private corporations as 
acquirers from the same home country? If so, do they arise from restrictions imposed by the target’s country or do 
they stem from preferences revealed in country attributes of the acquirer firm, such as the level of economic, 
institutional  or financial  development?  Are  the  characteristics and  attributes  of  the target firms  different  for 
government-led acquirers? Are the target firm’s share-price reactions around the announcement of a government-
                                                 
1 “Sovereign funds shake the logic of capitalism,” in The Financial Times (July 30, 2007).    2 
led block acquisition different than those of a corporate acquisition? How is the longer-run financial and operating 
performance of the target firm of a government-controlled acquisition different?  
Target firms become, at least, partially state-owned in such transactions and, as such, a major concern is that 
they  become  less  efficient  or  less  profitable  than  if  they  remained  privately-owned  firms  following  the 
acquisition. Indeed, there is a large literature that rationalizes how public enterprises are inefficient with excess 
employment and wages and with goods production that is closer to the needs of self-interested politicians or 
bureaucrats than any consumers. This inefficiency outcome arises naturally in a model of bargaining (through 
subsidies  and  bribes)  between  politicians  and  managers  in  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1994)  and  through  agency 
problems in the internal organization of governments between bureaucrats and politicians and among bureaucrats 
themselves, what Tirole (1994) calls “dissonant objectives” in the division of labor within government entities 
(due to information problems or incentive contracts). These two views are very different from that which regards 
public enterprise objectives as one of maximizing social welfare, curing market failures, and improving on the 
decisions of private enterprises when monopoly power or externalities introduce divergence between private and 
social objectives (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). But, whichever of these perspectives on government-controlled 
enterprises one accepts, there is an understanding that the financial and operating decisions differ from those of 
private enterprises and there is supportive empirical evidence in the relatively poor performance of state-owned 
banks and banking systems (by, among others,  Berger, Clarke,  Cull, Klapper and Udell, 2005; Mian, 2006; 
Micco, Panizza, and Yanez, 2007; and, Taboada, 2008) and of existing state-owned and newly-privatized firms 
(such as,  Boyko,  Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1993;  Megginson,  Nash  and  Randenborgh,  1994;  and,  Dewenter  and 
Malatesta, 1997, 2001).  
What motivates us to examine the motives for and consequences of cross-border acquisition activities of 
government-led acquirers is not only the significant increase in the activity in recent years, but also the heightened 
regulatory concerns that are now globally widespread. Consider, for example, the Dubai World Ports deal that 
was originally blocked by the U.S. Congress in March 2006 as it involved the potential transfer to a foreign 
government agency eleven terminals in six U.S. ports. One year later, Congress passed the Foreign Investment 
and National Security Act (FINSA) of 2007 that gave legal status to the little-known Committee on Foreign 
Investment  in  the  U.S.  (CFIUS),  a  multi-agency  group  formed  in  1975  to  monitor  U.S.  policy  on  foreign 
investments that may have any effect on national security.
2 In August 2008, China formed a committee to review 
                                                 
2 H.R. 556 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 was first introduced by Rep. Carolyn Maloney on January 
18, 2007 and signed into law by President Bush on July 26, 2007. The Act intends “to ensure national security  while 
promoting foreign investment and the creation and maintenance of jobs, to reform the process by which such investments are 
examined for any effect they may have on national security, to establish the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States,  and  for  other  purposes.”  The  full  text  of  the  legislation  is  available  at  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d110:h556. CFIUS was created in 1975 in the Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950 
in which, as the designee of the President, authority was granted to conduct an investigation into the possible impact on   3 
foreign acquisitions of local companies for national security concerns as an outgrowth of its 2006 Regulations on 
Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors.
3 In March 2009, Germany’s Federal 
Council approved an amendment to the German Foreign Trade and Payments Act to allow the German Federal 
Ministry  of  Economics  and  Technology  to  prohibit  investors  from  outside  Europe  from  buying  German 
enterprises (or voting stakes of 25% or more) if such acquisitions constitute a threat to security or public policy.
4 
If government-led acquirers do pursue different kinds of targets and if target firms’ shareholders react differently 
to the announcements of such acquisitions, the knowledge of how these deals differ in type and in terms and 
conditions can provide useful guidance on what kind of economic consequences such regulatory restrictions 
might have. Of course, if no differences are measurable, then one might wonder about the real value of such 
regulatory actions at all.  
We are further motivated to pursue this question by a potential advantage of our empirical design.
5 One of the 
challenges in implementing tests of the theoretical models of resource misallocation in public enterprises due to 
political bargaining over control rights, agency problems in bureaucracies or the pursuit of broader social 
objectives is that the predictions are diffuse. No specific alternative hypotheses arise and none can thus be rejected 
in favor of the null that the decisions of public and private corporations are similar. All of this limits the power of 
the tests. As a result, we build our sample of government-led cross-border acquisitions involving majority and 
minority stakes in target firms around the world  by culling it  from the broader sample of all cross -border 
acquisitions by corporate acquirers, so that we can anchor our inferences and tests with an appropriate benchmark. 
This benchmarking exercise allows us to benefit from an existing literature on corporate -led cross-border 
acquisitions that has advanced specific hypotheses as to why firms pursue them and has tested them empiricall y. 
For example, there is considerable work on cross-border mergers - linked with other international investments as 
foreign direct investment (FDI)   -  that focuses on  the role of  internal factors, including  corporate  synergies, 
relative labor costs, tax incentives, research and development (R&D) or technology advantages, to explain why a 
foreign firm would value domestic assets more highly than a domestic firm ( see, among many others,  Caves, 
1971; Williamson, 1979; Dunning, 1981, Cushman, 1987; Morck and Yeung, 1991; and, Graham and Krugman, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
national security of acquisitions involving “foreign persons which could result in foreign control of persons engaged in 
interstate commerce in the United States” (Title 50, U.S. Code § Appendix 2170(a)).  
3 “China forms committee to review foreign acquisitions, citing security,” (Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2008). 
4 See “Germany Establishes National Security Review of Foreign Investments” (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Publications, 
April 17, 2009 and http://www.bmwi.de/BMW/Redaktion/PDF). On August 4, 2009, Australia’s Treasurer Wayne Swan 
announced an easing of certain foreign investment rules to a higher threshold of 15% worth A$219 million or more (Media 
Press Release No. 089, http://ministers.treasury.gov.au). A February 2008 Report of the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, entitled “Laws and Policies Regulating Foreign Investment in 10 Countries,” provides a useful comparison of foreign 
investment review procedures in different countries (GAO-08-320, Table 3).  
5 This experimental design is similar to that advocated by Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz and Zutter (2008) in which they 
show that private acquirers pay a 63% lower premium to target shareholders compared to public acquirers. The power of their 
tests stems from cross-sectional regressions of target returns and bid premiums, dummy variables for the type of acquirer 
(private or public entity) and a number of control variables associated with alternative hypotheses that motivate acquisitions.   4 
1995, for a survey). More recent studies of FDI flows and cross-border merger activity advocate the importance of 
external factors, such as unexpected exchange rate shocks (Froot and Stein, 1991; Klein and Rosengren, 1994; 
Dewenter, 1995; Klein, Peek and Rosengren, 2002; and, Baker, Foley and Wurgler, 2009), tariffs on trade, capital 
controls and taxes (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Desai, Foley and Hines, 2004a, 2004b, 2006), of geography and 
stock market valuation differences (Erel-Koksal, Liao and Weisbach, 2009), differences in corporate governance 
and legal systems (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Antras, Desai and Foley, 2007; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; and Bris, 
Brisley and Cabolis, 2008), the role of institutional investors (Ferreira, Massa and Matos, 2009) and differences in 
market-wide capital scarcity (Chari, Chen and Dominguez, 2009).  
The arguments for each of these potential drivers of cross-border activity guide us to specific alternative 
hypotheses for the government-led acquisitions.  For example, Froot and Stein argue that wealth effects matter in 
cross-border deals because information problems in financial contracting cause external financing to be more 
costly  than  internal  financing.  When  a  firm’s  value  increases  (such  as  from  an  unexpected  exchange  rate 
appreciation in the currency of their home country), then the potential foreign acquirer can bid more aggressively 
for  domestic  assets  than  a  domestic  rival.  Self-interested  politicians,  bureaucracies  encumbered  by  agency 
problems or even those with broader social objectives that influence or control government agencies that might 
consider such overseas acquisition would be relatively less positively influenced by a real currency appreciation 
than an equivalent corporate acquirer domiciled in the same country. This constitutes a well-defined and specific 
testable  alternative  hypothesis  that  can  be  rejected  in  favor  of  the  null  that  government-  and  corporate-led 
acquisitions are  no  different. To  pursue  the  most robust  and  powerful tests, we  evaluate a  number  of  these 
alternative hypotheses and in terms of country-level factors that impact the overall level of cross-border activity 
across markets, in terms of the characteristics and attributes of target firms that government- and corporate-led 
acquirers pursue, and, finally, in terms of the share-price reactions to announcements of acquisitions by the two 
types of acquirers. 
It turns out that government-led cross-border acquisitions are much more likely to involve minority stakes in 
the target firms (involving more than 5% but less than 50% of target firm’s shares). Though less attention has 
been  paid  in  the  literature  on  minority  block  acquisitions  –  and  especially  on  cross-border  minority  block 
acquisitions – we are usefully guided by studies by Allen and Phillips (2000), Fee, Hadlock and Thomas (2006), 
Kang  and  Kim  (2008,  2009)  and  Liao  (2009).  Allen  and  Phillips  examine  400  corporate  minority  block 
acquisitions in the U.S. and find that firms purchase equity stakes in other firms as a form of partial integration 
between trade partners. Equity stakes solidify such product-market relationships, they argue, to ensure stable 
partnerships because otherwise incomplete contracting problems, particularly in high R&D expense industries, 
can make property rights blurry (Aghion and Tirole, 1994). An alternative reason for minority or partial equity 
stakes is to relieve financial constraints in firms lacking enough financial slack. Firms with high asymmetric 
information problems often seek financing from market intermediaries, such as commercial banks (Fama, 1985;   5 
James, 1987), private placement investors (Hertzel and Smith, 1993) or venture capitalists (Chan, 1983) who 
conduct  needed  due  diligence  and  ex  post  monitoring,  but  an  outside  corporation  might  already  possess 
substantial knowledge and experience in an industry and serve as a cheaper form of external financing. Fee, 
Hadlock and Thomas (2006) examine 10,000 customer-supplier relationships in the U.S. and show that partial 
equity stakes, though still rare between trading partners even in high R&D expense industries, are more likely to 
occur for financially-constrained suppliers. Liao (2009) broadens this analysis around the world and shows that 
financial constraints are even more important in other countries and especially in cross-border partial equity 
acquisitions. Kang and Kim (2008) study 700 block acquisitions in the U.S. and find that blockholders tend to 
invest in geographically-close firms and are more likely to pursue post-acquisition governance activities as a 
result; Kang and Kim (2009) examines 268 partial block acquisitions of U.S. target firms by foreign corporate 
acquirers and show that proximity matters here not only in terms of geographic distance, but also in terms of 
language, culture and similarity of legal systems. We propose and test each of these three specific alternative 
hypotheses in our paper. Are government-led acquirers, in fact, any less likely than corporate-led acquirers to take 
minority equity stakes in foreign targets in similar industries, in industries with high R&D expenses, in those with 
financial constraints or in those that are more proximate geographically or otherwise?    
Finally, our experimental design allows us to contribute in an important way to the recent literature focusing 
on sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and their investment strategies around the world. Studies by Kotter and Lel 
(2008), Bernstein, Lerner and Schoar (2009), Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009), Dewenter, Han and Malatesta 
(2009), Fernandes (2009), Fotak, Bortolotti, Megginson and Miracky (2009), Knill, Lee and Mauck (2009) each 
examine a list of SWFs from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (www.swfinstitute.org) or other related sites 
and compile data on equity investments for each SWF using a variety of sources.
6 Most of these studies examine 
only investments in publicly traded firms (except Bernstein, Lerner and Schoar who also consider private targets), 
almost all evaluate the share price reactions to their announcements and some consider longer-run consequences 
(including Kotter and Lel, Bernstein, Lerner and Schoar), and most differentiate between different SWFs by their 
varying levels of quality of governance and transparency as guided by  a scoring index developed by Edwin 
Truman (2007). Most of these studies find a positive and statistically significant share price reaction around the 
announcement of an SWF acquisition in a public target (e.g. 0.8% in Fotak, Bertolotti, Megginson and Miracky), 
but also negative longer-run buy-and-hold returns; Bernstein, Lerner and Schoar show that the price-to-earnings 
ratios of the industry peers of the firms in which SWFs invest decline by over the year; and, while Dewenter, Han 
                                                 
6 SWFs are broadly defined as public investment agencies which manage part of the foreign-currency assets of national states 
and are typically funded by commodity export (e.g. oil) revenues or the transfer of assets directly from official foreign 
exchange reserves. Useful background studies on SWFs as a growing force in global capital markets and their legal and 
organizational structures include Butt, Shivdasani, Stendevad and Wyman (2008), Jory, Perry and Hemphill (2008), Balding 
(2008) and a new book by Saw and Low (2009).   6 
and Malatesta uncover evidence of active monitoring by SWFs after the investment, Kotter and Lel show no 
evidence that operating performance or corporate governance changes.  
An important challenge for each of these studies is how to define the appropriate benchmark against which to 
judge these investment decisions. Most studies exploit the cross-section of SWFs by governance or transparency 
scores of Truman (2008), by the extent to external managers or politicians are involved in investment decisions, 
by whether the acquisitions are domestic or cross-border and only one – Chhaochharia and Laeven – calibrates the 
country allocations of SWFs against those of other global investors, specifically U.S. mutual funds (they find that 
SWFs strongly prefer investments in closer proximity geographically, and by language, ethnicity, and culture).  
Our study contributes to this emerging literature on SWFs by widening the lens on not just SWF acquisitions, 
but  also  those  by  government-controlled  corporations  and  agencies  that  are  not  SWFs  (and  which  include 
government-controlled entities that are owned and controlled by SWFs). Moreover, in our experiments, we are 
able to calibrate the cross-border acquisition choices of SWFs against non-SWF government acquirers as well as 
those of corporate acquirers. Our sample of government-led acquisitions is also by definition larger than most of 
these other studies which provides helpful statistical power for our basic inferences. Of course, we do only focus 
on acquisition blocks that exceed 5% of the target firm’s shares, so we are not able to compare our findings to 
those of Fernandes (2009), in which the sample exceeds 21,000 acquisitions, but for which the median size of the 
SWF investment stake in the target firm is only 0.25%. 
We use Thomson Reuters Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Corporate Transactions 
database to collect data on 155,696 announced cross-border acquisitions between 1990 and 2008 with a total 
(constant dollar) transaction value equal to $10.7 trillion. Government-controlled acquirers are identified as those 
in  which  the  acquirer  or  acquirer’s  ultimate  parent  is  flagged  as  a  government  entity,  and  these  include 
corporations or “financial buyer” (which is usually a sovereign wealth fund). We exclude leveraged buyouts, spin-
offs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers, repurchases and privatizations and we exclude acquirers 
from overseas territories of the U.K. and Netherlands that are tax havens, including the Bahamas, British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey and Netherland Antilles. We are ultimately left with a 
sample of 5,317 failed and completed government-led deals constituting over $619 billion over the period from 
1990 to 2008.  
We find significant cross-country variation in the cross-border activity that is led by government acquirers in 
terms  of  the  country  of  domicile  of  the  acquirers  and  of  the  host  targets.  China’s  government-controlled 
corporations represent the largest contingent having initiated $115 billion worth of acquisitions over this period, 
and  is  followed  closely  by  those  from  France  ($94  billion),  Singapore  ($69 billion)  and  Saudi  Arabia  ($23 
billion). As a fraction of the total dollar value of cross-border activity, Venezuela, UAE, China and Saudi Arabia 
lead with over 70% comprising government-led deals. Among countries that represent the prime targets for these 
government-led acquisitions, the U.S. is the largest in absolute terms ($124 billion), followed by the U.K. ($91   7 
billion), Hong Kong ($66 billion) and Australia ($27 billion), but, relative to the flow of corporate cross-border 
acquisitions that target their countries, the leaders are UAE (44%), Hong Kong (40%), Malaysia (20%), Finland 
(20%) and the Slovak Republic (20%).  We test the hypothesis that the overall cross-country determinants of 
cross-border acquisition flow from domicile of acquirer and to that of target are different for government-led deals 
and find that it is relatively more intense for geographically-closer countries, but also relatively less sensitive to 
differences in the level of economic development of the acquirer and target, of the quality of its legal institutions 
and accounting standards, and how stringent are the restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in the 
acquirer’s  country.  However,  overall  differences in the  determinants  of  government-controlled  and  corporate 
acquisition flows are economically small. 
When we turn our attention to a deal-level analysis, we show that there are few, if any, firm attributes of the 
target and country-level attributes of the target and acquirer that affect the likelihood of a cross-border deal led by 
a government acquirer any differently than a corporate acquirer. There is some evidence that government-led 
acquirers are more likely to pursue larger targets with greater growth opportunities (market-to-book ratios), and 
more financial constraints, but the explanatory power of these logistic regression models are generally quite low. 
We are able to reject almost all of the specific alternative hypotheses that we explore in favor of the null that these 
government-led acquisitions are no different than corporate acquisitions in the types of deals they pursue, so we 
interpret this evidence in the cross-border acquisition market as not supportive of the predictions of theories about 
resource  misallocation  due  to  political  bargaining,  agency  problems  or  the  mandate  of  social  objectives. 
Interestingly, SWF acquisitions tend to be less likely to fail than other government-led acquisitions and they are 
more  likely  to  pursue  targets  that  are  larger  in  total  assets  and  with  fewer  financial  constraints.  There  is 
considerable  more  explanatory  power  in  these  supplementary  tests  on  SWFs  than  in  those  comparing  all 
government-led and corporate-led acquisitions. 
Finally,  we  show  that  the  median  cumulative  abnormal  market-adjusted  returns  (CMARs)  around 
announcements (with a three-day investment horizon) of cross-border deals by corporate acquirers are 5.8% for 
those seeking majority stakes and 1.4% for minority stakes while those of government acquirers are only 2.1% 
and 1.0%, respectively. In cross-sectional tests, we are unable to detect any differences statistically once we 
control for various country-level and firm-specific factors and the resulting differences are economically small. 
The CMARs using longer horizon investment windows around the announcements are larger (up to 26% for 21 
day window), reliably positive statistically, but still insignificantly different for government-led and corporate-led 
cross-border acquisitions. The three-day CMARs are positive and statistically significant for both SWF-led and 
non-SWF-led government cross-border acquisitions, but there is reliable evidence that the former’s stock price 
reactions are statistically significantly lower (median 1.32% for non-SWFs instead of 0.88% for SWFs only).
7 Our 
                                                 
7 Our mean share-price reactions equal 1.52% to the 181 SWF acquisitions (1.41% for the 77 deals excluding financial 
services and utilities firms as targets) are very close in magnitude to the 1.52% and 2.15% 3-day market-model-adjusted   8 
novel  calibration  exercise  of  SWF  investments  relative  to  other  government-led  acquisitions  thus  lends  an 
important  new  perspective  on  how  much  –  or,  more  importantly,  how  little  -  the  market  reacts  to  SWF 
announcements.  
The plan of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we outline how we built our data and 
provide preliminary statistics on the level of cross-border activity that is led by government-controlled acquirers. 
Section 3 presents cross-sectional regression analysis of the determinants of the aggregate level of cross-border 
acquisition activity across countries by government-led and corporate acquirers, including a discussion of the 
alternative hypotheses that we explore and the country-level variables we use to test them. In Section 4, we shift 
to a deal-level analysis using a logistic regression analysis of government-led versus corporate-led deals. Our 
analysis of the share price reactions to the deal announcements follow in Section 5 and we end the paper with 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
A.  The Sample of Cross-Border Deals 
We use Thomson Reuters Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Corporate Transactions 
database to collect data on 155,696 announced cross-border acquisitions between 1990 and 2008 with a total 
(constant  dollar)  transaction  value  equal  to $10.6 trillion. We  collect  a number  of data  items,  including  the 
announcement date, whether it succeeded, failed or was withdrawn, the target’s name, its status (subsidiary, joint 
venture  partner,  private,  government-owned  or  publicly-listed  company),  its  4-digit  Standard  Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code and country of domicile, the name of the acquirer, its SIC code and country of domicile, 
its intermediate and ultimate parent firm’s name, status (if either relevant), and the deal value, if disclosed, and the 
fractional stake in the target that the deal represents. We only consider deals in which the fractional stake in the 
target exceeds 5% and classify the deal as a minority block acquisition if the fractional stake in the target is less 
than 50%. We also collected other deal characteristics, including the medium of exchange (cash/stock payment), 
whether the shares were purchased on the open market or through private negotiation and the 4-week premium 
paid for the shares acquired of the offer price relative to the 4-week trailing price of the target’s shares. We 
convert all deal values reported into U.S. dollars using national exchange rates from the WM/Reuters prevailing at 
the time of the deal (WMR quotes are based on 4:00pm London (Greenwich Mean Time) in U.K. Pound Sterling, 
which are, in turn, converted into U.S. dollars at the same U.S. dollar/Pound Sterling national exchange rate and 
we further report them in Constant 2000 U.S. dollar terms using the U.S. Consumer Price Index.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
returns in Dewenter, Han and Malatesta (2009) and Kotter and Lel (2008), respectively, but larger than the 0.82% 5-day 
market-model-adjusted returns in Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009), and 0.81% volatility- and market-adjusted 3-day returns 
in Fotak, Bortolotti, Megginson and Miracky (2009)..    9 
We exclude leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers, repurchases 
and privatizations and we exclude acquirers from overseas territories of the U.K. and Netherlands that are tax 
havens,  including  the  Bahamas,  British  Virgin  Islands,  Cayman  Islands,  Guernsey,  Isle  of  Man,  Jersey  and 
Netherland Antilles. This filter on cross-border acquirers from overseas territories excluded 10,962 corporate 
deals worth cumulatively $353 billion (in Constant 2000 U.S. dollars) or 6% of the sample count and 3% of the 
value of the entire sample.  
Government-controlled acquirers are identified as those in which the acquirer or acquirer’s ultimate parent is 
flagged as a government entity, and these include corporations or “financial buyers” (which usually signals an 
SWF). The variable of interest is “AUPPUB” and whether it identifies the ultimate parent as government-owned, 
which SDC defines as one in which 50% or more of the shares outstanding are government owned. We are 
ultimately left with a sample of 5,317 failed and completed cross-border deals constituting over $619 billion over 
the period from 1990 through 2008. We proceeded to double-check the ultimate parent’s ownership status at the 
time of the deal’s announcement by hand using a variety of company annual reports, regulatory filings, on-line 
news  reports  and  other  resources.  We  sorted  from  highest to  lowest  all  of  the  government-led  acquirers  by 
cumulative  total  U.S.  dollar  Constant  2000  value  (again  using  the  U.S.  Consumer  Price  Index  and  WMR 
exchange-rate quotes from Datastream) across all deals in which they were involved. We confirmed by hand the 
government-controlled status of the top 72 acquirers which ultimately represented 78% of the cumulative cross-
border deal value ($461 billion) and over 526 of the deals. Consider, for example, that the EDF (Electricité de 
France) Group of France, which was a 100% government-controlled until 2004 and is still 84%-owned by the 
government, initiated 19 acquisition deals between 1992 and 2008 cumulatively totaling $42.3 billion in Constant 
2000 U.S. dollars and its targets included Constellation Energy Group (U.S., $4.5 billion), Delmagyarorszagi 
Aramsolgalta (Hungary, $3.6 billion) and PowerGen plc (U.K., $3.4 billion). 
We also screened financial acquirers to be those firms whose primary SIC codes range between 6000 and 
6999. We double-check the name of the acquirer, its intermediary and ultimate parent against the list of names 
supplied on the SWF Institute website (www.swfinstitute.org) to confirm its status as an SWF. The largest SWFs 
in our data sample of cross-border acquisitions included Singapore’s Temasek Corporation, which was involved 
in 167 deals cumulatively totaling $39.8 billion, Singapore’s Government Investment Corporation (GIC; 81 deals, 
$19.8 billion), Saudi Arabia’s SABIC (4 deals, $12.3 billion),  Dubai World (39 deals, $17.2 billion), China 
Investment Corporation (7 deals, $7.4 billion) and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (22 deals, $8.7 billion). It 
is noteworthy that collectively SWFs are prominent among the largest cross-border acquirers, but they comprise 
less than $141 billion of the cumulative deal value, or one-quarter of our total of all government-led acquisition 
activity. But this relatively low cumulative value may arise from the difficulty of defining exactly what a SWF is,   10 
an important point which Fotak, Bertolotti, Megginson and Miracky (2009) so aptly point out (see their Panels A 
and B, Table I comparing SWF classifications by Truman (2007) and by the SWF Institute).
8 
B.  Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics – overall and by year - on the number and cumulative value of cross-
border  acquisition  deals  involving  at  least  a  5%  stake  in  a  target  corporation.  In  Panel  A,  we  report  those 
associated with government-controlled acquirers and, in Panel B, those with corporate acquirers. In each panel, 
we present the total number of deals, only those in which transaction values are reported, the cumulative and 
average  per  deal  value  across  all  those  for  which  data  is  reported,  the  number  of  failed  deals  (rejected  or 
withdrawn), those involving minority stakes (less than 50% of target shares), those involving financial acquirers 
and the number of targets that are publicly-listed corporations. As noted above, our overall sample across all years 
constitutes 5,317 deals cumulatively totaling $619 billion in value, which represents about 3.5% of all corporate-
led acquisitions (150,379) and 6% of their cumulative value ($10.1 trillion). Figure 1 already demonstrated that a 
significant increase in government-led acquisition activity occurred in 2007 and 2008, particularly in terms of 
cumulative deal value. Almost 17% of all government-led acquisition deals and 37% of the cumulative value were 
concentrated in those two years. Corporate-led acquisition activity was also heightened during 2007-2008, but not 
as intensely in terms of cumulative value of all deals ($2.26 trillion, or only 22%).   
Only 1,812 of the 5,317, or about one-third of the government-led acquisition deals report deal values which 
implies that many deals involve subsidiaries, plants or joint venture transactions in which the deal value is too 
small to report, there are differences across countries in disclosure requirements or the parties to the transaction, 
both companies themselves and their advisors, simply choose not to do so. The third explanation is most likely as 
the proportion of corporate deals for which values are disclosed is much higher at 46% (69,877 deals reported out 
of 150,379 in total). The average deal value involving a government-controlled acquirer is twice the size of 
corporate acquirers ($238 million versus $137 million) and this difference has widened in recent years ($572 
million versus $137 million in 2008) with the large SWF-led acquisition deals in major financial institutions. The 
most prominent examples include GIC of Singapore’s $9.8 billion stake in UBS, GIC and Abu Dhabi Investment 
Council’s $6.9 billion and $7.6 billion stakes in Citigroup, China Investment Corporation’s $5 billion in Morgan 
Stanley and Singapore’s Temasek Holdings and the Kuwaiti Investment Authority’s $5 billion and $3.7 billion 
investment  in  Merrill  Lynch.  As  a  fraction  of  the  total  number  of  deals  initiated  by  government-controlled 
                                                 
8  By  comparison,  Bernstein,  Lerner  and  Schoar  (2009)  identify  1752  deals  by  SWFs  averaging  $351  million  per  deal 
implying about $615 billion in cumulative SWF activity, but these are not inflation adjusted and the sample runs from 1983 
to 2007. Fotak, Bertolotti, Megginson and Miracky (2009) in their SDC sample evaluate 141 deals at $572 million per deal or 
cumulatively $80.6 billion. Their Bureau van Dijk “Zephyr” sample is much larger at 314 deals at €1.253 billion per deal or 
$1.57 trillion over 1997-2008. Beck and Fidora (2008) report $91.5 billion of deal activity in 2007 and 2008 alone, which, in 
turn, dwarfs any of the other samples. A quick check of their Table 2 of the “major” investments with our sample confirms 
that we have most of their largest deals.    11 
acquirers, more than one-third fail (1,926 out of 5,317); by contrast, only 26% of the sample of corporate-led 
acquisition deals fail.  
Another major difference between the government-led and corporate-led acquisitions is the proportion of 
them that involve minority stakes in the target firm; over 63% of government-led deals involve stakes below 50%, 
while only 41% of corporate deals do.  The finance literature proposes that the motives behind these two types of 
transactions differ, so we will separate out the majority control and minority stake deals for both government and 
corporate acquirers in most of our analysis. A large fraction (26%) of the government-led deals involve financial 
acquirers (designated by SIC codes 6000 to 6999); many of these are identified as SWFs or financial holding 
companies for which the intermediary parent is a SWF. Finally, more than one-third of the sample of targets 
among government-led deals involves a publicly-traded firm, a much higher fraction than for corporate deals 
(only 17,845 out of 150,379 or 11%). This is an important constraint for our analysis at the deal level for which 
we will need to obtain financial statement information to evaluate by which attributes the targets of government 
and corporate acquirers differ.    
 
3.  Determinants of Cross-Border Acquisition Activity Led by Government-Controlled Acquirers 
A.  Measuring the Level of Cross-Border Acquisition Activity by Type of Acquirer 
Our  next  goal  is  to  measure  whether  the  level  of  cross-border  acquisition  activity  led  by  government-
controlled acquirers differs from that of corporate acquirers by the country of the acquirer and the target firms. 
Does deal activity that is led by government-controlled acquirers emanate from some countries more intensely 
than others? Are government-controlled acquirers more likely to pursue targets in certain countries over others? If 
so, in either case, what are the country-level attributes or market conditions of those countries that dominate 
government-led cross-border acquisition activity and which determine the target markets that attract this activity? 
In order to answer these questions, we need to compute two kinds of cross-border ratios of deal counts and 
cumulative  deal  value  (in  2000  Constant  U.S.  dollars):  the  first  measures  the  fraction  of  all  cross-border 
acquisition activity emanating from a given country i which involves government-led acquirers and the second 
measures the fraction of all acquisition activity that targets a particular country j which involves government-led 
acquirers. In order to measure these fractions in a reasonable way, there must be sufficient activity overall to 
justify its consideration, so we exclude countries in which there are fewer than 50 cross-border acquisitions, 
whether led by government-controlled or corporate acquirers.
9  
In Table 2, we report the countries in rank order by those which have the highest fractions of government-led 
activity measured by cumulative deal value by acquirer country (Panel A) and by target country (Panel B). The 
acquirer countries in which government-led deals dominate all cross-border activity include Venezuela (85% of 
                                                 
9 This constraint has only a modest impact on the overall sample. The overall count of cross-border deals fall from 5,317 to 
4,759 and the cumulative deal value drops from $619 billion to $592 billion.   12 
deal value, 47% of deal counts), UAE (77%, 48%), China (72%, 39%), Saudi Arabia (70%, 50%), the Czech 
Republic  (68%,  17%),  Khazakhstan  (65%,  17%)  and  Kuwait  (62%,  18%).  By  raw  cumulative  deal  value, 
however, China leads the list with 833 deals and $114 billion of deal activity, both statistics that far exceed any 
other countries in the sample (interestingly, France  is second with  717 deals and $93 billion). Many of the 
countries at the top of the list are those that are typically identified with large SWFs built up with accumulated 
foreign currency reserves due to oil exports and export-driven trade, but it is not exclusively so (e.g. France, Italy, 
Japan, Sweden each represent more than $20 billion of government-led deal activity).  
The  leading  target  countries  for  government-led  cross-border  acquisition  activity  are  somewhat  more 
surprising. UAE has the highest fraction by cumulative deal value (44%), but its fraction by the count of deals is 
low (3%) indicating that several large deals dominate their market. Hong Kong is second by the fraction of 
cumulative deal value (40%), first by fraction of deal count (16%), and is by far the largest target market in 
absolute terms (583 deals, $66 billion) on the list. Much of this activity stems from the government-led deals 
emanating from China, as seen in Panel A. But, in fact, the U.S. and U.K. are both larger target markets in both 
instances at $125 billion and $90 billion, respectively. Because the fraction of the activity that targets the U.S. and 
U.K. with government-led acquirers is so low (less than 4%), they are both reported in the “Others” category and 
dominate it almost exclusively. The other countries that are primary targets for government-led cross-border 
acquisitions include Malaysia (20% of deal value, 4% of deal count), Finland (20%, 4%), the Slovak Republic 
(20%, 6%), Egypt (17%, 7%) and Indonesia (17%, 13%).  
Though it is relatively easy to connect the dominant presence of China’s government-led acquirers in Hong 
Kong as the primary target market, it is more complex to discern it for the broader level of activity around the 
world. We will develop another more refined measure of the proportion of government-led activity by pairs of 
acquirer and target countries next, but Figure 2 offers a preliminary look by region. In Panel A, we report the 
countries in declining rank by raw cumulative deal value led by government-controlled acquirers and indicate 
which regions they target for their activity. For China’s $114 billion of deal activity, the largest target component 
is Developed Asia (about $65 billion, almost all of which targets Hong Kong), followed by the U.S./Canada 
(about  $25  billion)  and  Developed  Europe  (about  $10  billion).  France’s  $90  billion  of  government-led 
acquisitions mostly target Developed Europe, then the U.S./Canada, whereas Singapore’s acquisitions are evenly 
split between Developed Asia and Europe. UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’ s government-led acquirers total about $65 
billion each, but UAE’s prefer Developed Asia and Europe whereas Saudi Arabia’s tilt their acquisitions toward 
Developed Europe and the U.S./Canada. 
The U.S. is the largest target country for government-led acquisitions ($125 billion) and, in Panel B, we note 
that the dominant acquirer countries are surprisingly from the EMEA region (Emerging Europe, Middle East and 
Africa), followed by Developed Europe and then Emerging Asia. The $90 billion in government-led acquisition 
activity targeting the U.K. arises from Developed Europe, Developed Asia and then the EMEA region. For Hong   13 
Kong, the dominance of Emerging Asia (mostly all China) in its $65 billion of deal activity is quite apparent. 
Cross-border  activity  involving  government-controlled  acquirers  targeting  Australia  almost  exclusively  come 
from Emerging and Developed Asia. 
B.  Evaluating Alternative Hypotheses for Cross-Border Acquisition Activity 
We  next  disaggregate  our  measure  of  cross-border  activity  due  to  government-controlled  acquirers  into 
country pairs. But, in order to do this, we need to benchmark  the activity to construct fractions and in two 
different ways: first, by the total government-led activity that emanates from the acquirer’s home country and, 
second, by the total government-led activity that selects the target firm’s country. That is, when evaluating by 
acquirer country, we divide the total number of deals (or cumulative deal value) involving government-controlled 
acquirers from country i that targets country j by all government-led acquisition activity emanating from country i 
over  the  period.  When  evaluating  by  target  country,  we  compute  the  fraction  of  total  number  of  deals  (or 
cumulative  deal  value)  involving  government-led  acquirers that  targets  country  j  from  country  i  to  the  total 
activity by government-led acquirers that target country j.  
One important advantage of our experimental design is that we can perform the exact same computations for 
all corporate-led cross-border acquisition activity between country pairs. Even more importantly, we can compute 
the differences between the fraction of government-led activity that takes place between countries i and j and the 
fraction of corporate-led activity that takes place between those same two countries.
10 In this way, we are able to 
determine whether government-led acquirers from country  i  disproportionately  identify  targets  in  country  j 
relative to corporate acquirers that come from country i and whether government-led acquirers that target country 
j do so from acquirer countries that are different from corporate acquirers that target firms in country j. Our 
approach represents a natural benchmarking experiment that is similar in spirit to that employed by Rossi and 
Volpin  (2004),  Erel,  Liao  and  Weisbach  (2009),  and  others  to  benchmark  cross-border  acquisition  activity 
between country pairs relative to domestic acquisition activity in one of the countries. In order that the calculation 
of  this  ratio  is  sensible,  we  further  impose  the  restriction  that  the  total  number  of  cross-border  deals  by 
government-controlled acquirers from a given acquirer country exceeds 30 over the period of our analysis (in 
addition to the constraint that the total number of all cross-border deals must exceed 50 over the period).
11  
What country-level factors determine  toward  which target countries government -led acquirers  tilt their 
acquisition activity? Are these country-level factors the same as those that influence  the decisions of corporate 
                                                 
10 We have also calculated other proxies to measure these differences. For example, we compute the ratios of the fraction of 
government-led activity that takes place between countries i and j relative to the fraction of all government and corporate-led 
activity that takes place between those same two countries.  
11 With 64 countries represented in our overall sample of cross -border acquisitions, the potential number of count ry-pair 
observations is the square of the number of countries (64 × 63 or 4032). The effect of these screens is to limit the number o f 
observations to include about 40 countries. We explored a number of alternative screens and, in fact, our cross -sectional 
regression analysis shows the sensitivity of our inferences to different screens based on the explanatory variables we includ e 
in the various specifications.   14 
acquirers?  Which  factors,  if  any,  can  explain  differences  in  the  patterns  of  cross-border  acquisitions  by 
government-led and corporate acquirers? We propose a number of possible explanations for these cross-country 
acquisition patterns as drawn from prior literature. 
  Valuation Differences Between Target and Acquirer Firms.  Differences in valuations between target and 
acquirer firms can affect merger and acquisition propensities through two channels. Froot and Stein (1991) 
argue that differences in wealth that occur because of exchange rate or other shocks provide a financing 
advantage, lowering the cost of a potential acquisition. A wealthier country effectively has a lower cost of 
capital,  leading  its  firms  to  purchase  assets  outside  the  country,  including  other  companies.  The  second 
channel through which valuations can drive mergers and acquisitions is if these valuations diverge from 
fundamentals (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003).
12 Given misvaluation, managers of a relatively overvalued firm 
will have incentives to purchase undervalued assets, especially if they can use their overvalued stocks as a 
means of payment. Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2009) find differences in real stock market returns and in real 
exchange rate changes explain much of the level cross -border merger activity between country pairs and 
argue that it can stem from overall differences in investor sentiment and from currency movements that are 
more than warranted by changing underlying economic conditions. In a closely related effort to ours, 
Bernstein, Lerner and Schoar (2009) find that SWFs do choose foreign investments that are in industries with 
relatively low P/E ratios, so, for such types of government-controlled acquirers at least, valuation differences 
matter. We predict that stock return differences of  the country indices (average annual local -currency real 
stock market returns) and the relative appreciation of the two countries’ currencies (the average annual real 
exchange  rate  return)  over  the  sample  period  will  be  associated  with  more  acquisition  activity  between 
country pairs and, under our central null hypothesis, activity led by government-controlled and corporate 
acquirers would be no differently affected by these valuation differences. Details on our construction of the 
stock market returns and exchange rate changes are in Appendix Table A1 and summary statistics are in Table 
A2. 
 
  The Role of Corporate Governance. In a world of perfect markets, corporate assets would be channeled 
toward their best possible use. Mergers and acquisitions facilitate this process by reallocating control over 
companies. However, frictions such as transactions costs, information problems, and agency conflicts can 
prevent efficient transfers of control. Recent studies of corporate governance employ measures of the quality 
of the legal and regulatory environment within a country as proxies for some of these frictions and show that 
differences  in  legal  systems,  regulation,  accounting  and  disclosure  requirements  correlate  with  the 
development of capital markets, the ownership structure of firms, the cost of capital and in the intensity and 
the pattern of merger and acquisition activity around the world.
13 Rossi and Volpin (2004), Starks and Wei 
(2004), Antras, Desai and Foley (2007), Bris and Cabolis (2008) and Bris, Brisley an d Cabolis (2008) find 
that cross-border mergers and acquisition activity between two countries increases the  greater the difference 
in the quality of investor protections and accounting standards between the acquirer’s and target’s countries.
14 
Liao (2009)  shows, however, that cross -border minority block acquisitions are much less affected by 
differences in legal systems, regulation or accounting and disclosure requirements. Studies of investment 
decisions by SWFs do emphasize governance-related motives, but most focus on fund-related measures of 
transparency (based on scoring system of Truman (2007)) or on political affiliations of SWF board members 
(Bernstein, Lerner and Schoar, 2009) and not of the country of domicile.  We also consider a related measure 
of the autocratic control or democratic nature of the government as a proxy for the risk of agency conflicts 
                                                 
12  For  evidence  of  valuation  drivers  of  domestic  merger  activity,  see  Moeller,  Schlingemann  and  Stulz  (2005),  Dong, 
Richardson, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2006), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), and, in terms of FDI flows, see Baker, 
Foley and Wurgler (2008). 
13 Important contributions that support these inferences, among many others, include La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997, 1998), Hail and Leuz (2006) 
14 These studies also show that the takeover premiums are smaller and the fraction of the deal financed with cash is lower, the 
higher the quality of the foreign bidding firm’s home country governance.   15 
that stem from politicians or bureaucracies pursuing their self interests (Stulz, 2005). We predict that larger 
positive differences in investor protection (using the anti-self dealing index of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes  and  Shleifer  (2008)),  democracy  of  the  political  system  (using  the  PolityIV  scores  of 
democracy/autocracy) and in accounting standards (using the Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research scores in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998)) will be associated with more 
acquisition activity between country pairs and, under our central null hypothesis, activity led by government-
controlled  and  corporate  acquirers  would  be  no  differently  affected  by  these  governance  and  disclosure 
differences. Details on these variables are also in Appendix Table A1 with summary statistics in Table A2. 
 
  Geographic Proximity. The empirical literature on trade and FDI flows emphasizes the important role that 
geography  plays  (among  others,  see the  gravity  models of  Anderson,  1979; Portes  and  Rey,  2005; and, 
Anderson and Wincoop, 2003). The arguments are based indirectly on the role of transactions costs, tariffs 
and  barriers  that  are  linked  to  bilateral  geographical  distance,  although  they  can  similarly  be  linked  to 
commonness  of  culture,  language,  ethnicity  and  religion  (Stulz  and  Williamson,  2003).  Coeurdacier,  De 
Santis and Aviat (2009) emphasize that geographic distance is a primary force driving cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions, especially among developing countries, and there is additional support in Rossi and Volpin 
(2004) and Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2009) though they do not emphasize these findings. Kang and Kim 
(2009) examines 268 partial equity block acquisitions of U.S. target firms by foreign corporate acquirers and 
show that proximity matters here not only in terms of geographic distance, but also in terms of language, 
culture and similarity of legal systems. Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) show that foreign equity holdings of 
SWFs are most importantly explained by geographic distance, ethnicity, language and religion.  We predict 
that closer geographic proximity (using great circle distance, see Tables A1 and A2) will be associated with 
more  acquisition  activity  between  country  pairs  and,  under  our  central  null  hypothesis,  activity  led  by 
government-controlled and corporate acquirers would be no differently affected by geographic distance. 
 
  Control Variables. We examine a number of other variables that have been proposed as a potential driver of 
cross-border merger and acquisition flows in the literature. We include differences in the logarithm of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, as a measure of the country’s wealth, and in average real GDP growth as 
a proxy for the change in macroeconomic conditions. Rossi and Volpin (2009), Chari, Chen and Dominguez 
(2009), and Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2009) show that developed countries’ firms are, in fact, more likely to 
acquire less developed countries’ firms. Couerdacier, De Santis and Aviat (2009) show that the European 
integration process – through joining the European Union (EU) and/or the Euro bloc – led to a doubling of 
merger and acquisition activity towards their members and away from the rest of the world, so we include a 
dummy variable for those country pairs that involve both as members of the EU. We also create a dummy 
variable if the target country is a tax haven, as designated by the International Monetary Fund’s List of 
Countries, Territories and Jurisdictions with offshore financial centers (see Table A1). We include a measure 
of correlation of returns between the national indexes of the two countries to evaluate the importance of risk 
diversification as a motive. The lower the returns correlation between countries, the more important the risk 
diversification motive for the acquirer. Finally, for a subset of OECD countries, Golub (2003) devised a 
scoring system for the overall restrictiveness on inward FDI for each country, based foreign ownership limits 
on equity, mandatory screening, licensing and approval, nationality restrictions on board members, and input 
and operational restrictions. Government-controlled acquirers are, after all, more likely to be impacted by FDI 
restrictions  because  of  political  concerns  related  to  threats  to  national  security  and  excessive  political 
influence (Graham and Krugman, 1995).  
  
C.  Country-Level Results 
Table  3  presents  the  results  of  our  cross-sectional  regressions  of  the  level  of  government-controlled 
acquisitions across country pairs. In Panel A, we show the results by acquirer country in which the number of 
cross-border deals between two countries is divided by the total cross-border activity emanating from the country   16 
of the acquirer, and, in Panel B, we show the results by target country in which the divisor is the total cross-border 
activity attracted to the country of the target. Most of the specifications (Models 1 to 10) are for government-
controlled acquirers, but results are also presented for corporate acquirers (Models 11 to 14) and for the difference 
between the two (Model 15). Models 9 and 13 focus on government-led and corporate acquisition activity only in 
terms of deals that involve a minority stake in the target firm, whereas Models 10 and 14 measure only cross-
border majority-control merger deal activity for the two types of acquirers. The models are all estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity.  
For the results by acquirer country in Panel A, Model 1 shows that there is a valuation effect, but it has low 
explanatory power (R
2 less than 1%) and it only involves the exchange rate return. Surprisingly, the negative 
coefficient implies that government-controlled firms from countries whose currencies have appreciated over the 
period are less likely to be acquirers of firms whose currencies depreciated. This result is not reliable, and, in fact, 
disappears in the all-inclusive Model 7. Interestingly, when we measure the acquisition activity by the value of the 
deals (in Constant 2000 U.S. dollars) in Model 8, the exchange rate effect takes on the expected positive sign. The 
equivalent specifications for corporate acquisitions are in Models 11 (for number of deals) and 12 (for value of 
deals). The valuation effects are somewhat more reliably positive for the corporate deals, but these differences are 
economically small. In fact, in Model 15 for the ratio of government-controlled to corporate acquisitions by 
acquirer country, there is no reliable difference statistically.  
Differences in the level of economic development do matter, but surprisingly with the wrong sign. Acquirers 
from better economically developed countries are less likely to acquire firms in less developed countries and this 
finding is reliable for the multiple regression Models 7 and 8 for government-controlled acquirers and corporate 
acquirers (Models 11 and 12). It may arise from the large number of SWFs located in less-developed countries, 
but this would not explain why the results are similar for corporate acquirers. Model 15 performs the regression 
with the difference between government-controlled and corporate acquisition activity and shows that this wealth 
effect is statistically indistinguishable between the two types. Average GDP growth differences between target 
and acquirer countries do not have any explanatory power. 
Geographic proximity matters. The closer are the two countries, the higher the level of government-controlled 
acquisition activity between them. Moreover, the market correlation measure is also statistically reliably different 
from zero, but with a positive sign. Government-controlled acquirers are more likely to pursue targets in countries 
that are less likely to diversify their risks. Both coefficients are positive and significant in the simple and multiple 
regressions. Interestingly, they are similarly so and with same magnitude of coefficients for corporate acquirers. 
There is a good chance that the market correlation measure proxies for the same kind of proximity measures that 
other cross-border merger studies have uncovered associated with regional blocs, religion, culture or language.  
The governance, democracy and accounting standards variables are generally not reliable in the specification 
for government-led acquisition activity (Models 5 and 6). The coefficient on accounting standards is negative   17 
implying acquirers from countries with better standards are less likely to pursue targets in countries with weaker 
standards, which is not what we would expect. An exception is Golub’s measure of FDI restrictiveness of the 
country of the target for which the coefficient is negative and significant, as expected. Government-controlled 
acquirers are less likely to pursue targets in countries with more FDI restrictions. Though not shown in the table, 
the coefficients on accounting standards and on FDI restrictiveness are of the same sign and magnitude for the 
corporate acquisitions.  
Overall,  the  findings  in  Panel  A  indicate  that  the  country  drivers  of  cross-border  acquisitions  led  by 
government-controlled acquirers are similar to those led by corporate acquirers, at least from the perspective of 
the acquirer. Overall, the R
2 in Model 15 of the ratio of government-led to corporate acquisitions across country 
pairs is less than 1%. The only variable that is significant, and only weakly so, is that associated with the tax 
haven dummy control variable. The motives for acquisitions, at least, are indistinguishable for government and 
corporate acquirers. 
The  results  in  Panel  B  for  acquisition  activity  between  countries  by  target  country  are  different.  The 
perspective in this case is taken from that of the target firm in terms of which attributes and market conditions in 
the  country  of  the  government-led  acquirer  matter.  Models  1  and  7  (multiple  regression),  as  well  as  those 
exclusively  for  minority  stakes  (Model  9)  and  majority  control acquisitions  (Model  10)  show  that  valuation 
differences matter and in a way we expect. Target firms are more likely to attract government acquirers from 
countries with higher stock market valuations and more favorable exchange rate movements over the period. The 
effect is weaker for corporate acquisitions (see Model 11 for deal count and 12 by deal value) and the differences 
are, in fact, statistically significant (see Model 15). The economic magnitude of the difference is not trivial, 
however. Consider that the coefficient on the real exchange rate change is 0.09 for government-led deals and is 
0.02 for corporate deals. A one-standard-deviation increase in the real exchange rate for a given country pair (or 
12.7%) is associated with an increase of 1.1% (0.09 × 0.127) in cross-border government acquisitions, which is a 
55% increase relative to its unconditional mean (average level of cross-border acquisitions between country pairs 
is 2%) and about 16% of its unconditional standard deviation (cross-sectional standard deviation in level of 
acquisitions  between  country  pairs  is  7.1%).  The  equivalent  exchange-rate  impact  associated  with  corporate 
acquisitions is 0.3% (0.02 × 0.127), which is only a 23% increase relative to its unconditional mean and only 
about 8% of its unconditional standard deviation. Similar differences in economic magnitude pertain to stock 
market return differences. 
We also see that there are important differences among drivers of government-led and corporate acquisitions 
in terms of the level of economic development and the role of geographic proximity and market correlation. 
Model 15 shows that, from the target’s perspective, knowing that an acquirer is from a better developed country 
matters  more  for  corporate  than  government  acquirers.  Acquisitions  from  geographically  close  and  between 
markets with higher correlations are more likely in both cases, but the risk motive matters less for government-led   18 
acquisitions. There is some weak evidence that cross-border deals within the EU involving corporate acquirers are 
less likely than those involving government-led acquirers. Although not shown in the tables, the governance 
motive for cross-border acquisitions is much weaker for corporate deals than for government-led deals. The 
negative and significant coefficients on anti-self dealing (Model 4) and on democracy (Model 5) for government 
acquirers, both of which run the opposite of what we would expect based on Rossi and Volpin (2004) and others, 
is indistinguishable from zero for corporate acquirers. The negative coefficient on the FDI restrictiveness variable 
of  Golub  (2003)  is  very  similar  in  precision  and  magnitude  for  both  government-controlled  and  corporate 
acquirers. 
Overall, the results in Panel B point to some discernible differences in the importance of country factors for 
government-controlled and corporate acquirers. But it is important to note that the overall explanatory power of 
these models is quite low. The best specification to explain government-controlled acquisition activity is 11% 
(Model 7) and that for the corporate acquisition activity is 16% (Model 11). It is quite likely that there are 
important unobservable factors for both target and acquirer countries. In fact, comparable studies by Rossi and 
Volpin (2004) and Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2009) include target and acquirer fixed effects and obtain adjusted 
R
2 around 50% for similar samples of corporate cross-border acquisitions. We expect that many of the differences 
we see in Table 3 associated with each of these specific alternative hypotheses (differences in market valuations, 
in governance, and geographic proximity) would likely diminish with the inclusion of country fixed effects. We 
also performed a number of robustness tests in terms of the composition of the sample. When we consider only 
developed countries or only OECD countries (per the Golub (2003) sample), the number of country pairs drops to 
a third of its original size (around 556 from  1500). Many of the results for both government-controlled and 
corporate acquirer deal activity – whether from the perspective of the acquirer country (Panel A) or target country 
(Panel B) – are statistically more reliable and economically more important, but the differences between types of 
acquirers are even weaker still.  
 
4.  What Factors Drive Government-Controlled Acquirers in Cross-Border Deals? 
A.  Logistic Regression Analysis 
We have documented so far that valuation and governance factors and geographic proximity as country-level 
factors appear to play a role in determining which firms are likely to merge with or acquire stakes in other firms 
across borders. What we have also shown is that the statistical and economic differences between acquisitions led 
by government-controlled acquirers and those led by corporate acquirers are small. One of the problems with this 
analysis is that it is aggregated activity at the level of country pairs for our sample period. Consequently, it fails to 
account  for  firm-level  and  deal-specific  factors  that  potentially  affect  the  decision  to  acquire.  There  is  a 
substantial literature that shows that the likelihood of being a merger target or even that involving a minority stake 
is  affected  importantly  by  the  target  firm’s  own  financial  and  operating  conditions,  ownership  structure,   19 
governance, those of the acquirer, as well as the terms and conditions of the deal. Unfortunately, to control for 
firm-level factors, we must consider only the subsample of target firms for which we have public data. This 
subsample is necessarily unrepresentative of the overall sample of mergers and acquisitions. In fact, in Table 1, 
and as discussed earlier, the number of public targets of government-controlled acquirers falls by half (5,317 to 
2,261 deals) and those for corporate deals falls by 88% (150,379 to 17,845 deals). The sample erodes because we 
exclude target firms in the financial services and utilities sectors and even further depending on what firm-specific 
variables are readily available in Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope database, our primary source, and the impact of 
this constraint may be disproportionate for targets in emerging markets where Worldscope’s coverage may be 
more limited. The key for our analysis, however, is whether the impact of these data constraints and consequences 
are different for those deals involving government-controlled acquirers than corporate acquirers. 
With these cautions in mind, we perform the following experiment. We estimate a logistic regression (logit) 
model to predict whether an observed cross-border acquisition is initiated by a government-controlled acquirer 
(dependent variable equals one) or a corporate acquirer (equals zero). Intuitively, this approach presumes that 
corporate-led acquisitions represent a reasonable benchmark through which we can understand the nature of 
government-controlled acquirers. All specifications include country (acquirer) and year fixed effects with robust 
standard errors controlling for heteroscedasticity. The coefficients are all reported in terms of marginal effects to 
allow  for  economic  interpretation.  Given  that  such  a  large  proportion  of  government-controlled  acquisitions 
involve minority stakes in the targets, we test our models for minority and majority-control deals separately. 
B.  Evaluating Alternative Hypotheses for Deal Determinants 
Our central null hypothesis is that government-controlled acquirers are not any more likely to occur than 
corporate acquirers in cross-border acquisition deals and that the firm-level and deal-specific determinants are not 
different for the two types of deal. To give power to our tests of this null, we need to identify firm-level and deal-
specific variables associated with specific alternative hypotheses that we might be able to reject in favor of the 
null. Some of these alternative hypotheses carry over from our analysis at the country level in the previous 
section. Valuation differences can matter at the deal level in cross-border transactions due to unexpected changes 
in exchange rates or market returns or due to deviations of those valuations from fundamentals. In deal-specific 
setting, we evaluate valuations in a more timely way using the trailing 12-month market and exchange rate returns 
in the target country.  
We evaluate the governance motive, not by use of the anti-self dealing, accounting standards or PolityIV 
democracy indexes, but rather by employing a variable related to the ownership structure of the target. The 
corporate governance literature has emphasized the monitoring role of outside shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Pagano and Roell, 1998). Yet, greater monitoring by large blockholders does not necessarily assure value 
maximizing policies (see, among others, Grossman and Hart, 1986; Burkart, Gromb and Panuzzi, 1997; and, 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). Whether target firms have large blocks of shares held closely by institutions,   20 
corporate directors or managers could play a role in an environment characterized by agency problems. Indeed, 
the fraction of closely-held shares is often used as a proxy for agency costs (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Doidge, 
Karolyi, Lang, Lins and Stulz, 2008) and Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2009) show that a large block of closely-held 
shares  can  deter  foreign  investment  in  the  firm.  We  use  a  proxy  for  closely-held  share  ownership  from 
Worldscope.
15 Specifically, we create a dummy variable for those target firms that lie in the highest quartile of all 
Worldscope firms in terms of closely -held shares.  We predict, under our null hypothesis, that government -
controlled acquirers are no more likely to pursue a target in another co untry with a higher fraction of shares 
closely-held by institutions and insiders than are corporate acquirers. 
We also investigate two additional alternative hypotheses that arise from the literature on minority or partial 
block acquisitions and also include a series of firm-level control variables. 
  Product Market Relationships and the Contracting Motive. Product market relationships between customers 
and suppliers are often strengthened by a partial integration of the two firms. Studies by Williamson (1979), 
Grossman  and  Hart (1986)  and  Aghion  and Tirole (1994)  have rationalized  circumstances  in  which full 
integration (merger) versus partial integration (partial equity stakes) might be optimal with specific regard to 
information environments in which incomplete contracting arises. We explore two variables related to product 
market relationships and contracting problems. The first is a dummy variable is a proxy for whether product 
market relationship might exist and it simply identifies deals in which the acquirer and target are in the same 
industry (based on the first three digits of the firm’s Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code). Aghion 
and Tirole argue that property rights become blurry and contracting more complex when it comes to research 
and development (R&D) activities, so firms that partner and share knowledge in such industries can easily 
benefit or hurt the other party in ways outside the scope of any contract. Our second variable measures 
whether the target firm operates in a global industry (four-digit SIC code) which is in the upper quartile of all 
U.S.  firms  by  ratio of  R&D  expenses to total  assets. Target  firms  in high  R&D  expense industries  and 
circumstances in which target and acquirer are in the same industry are more likely to involve a minority or 
majority stake, but, under our null hypothesis, we predict that government-controlled acquirers are not more 
likely than corporate acquirers to pursue cross-border deals with such circumstances. 
 
  Financial Constraints and the Financing Motive. Another reason for at least partial equity stakes is that target 
firms are financially constrained. Firms facing high asymmetric information problems seek financing from 
intermediaries,  such  as  banks  (Fama,  1985),  private  placement  investors  (Hertzel  and  Smith,  1993)  and 
venture capitalists (Chan, 1983) who conduct ex-post monitoring. Another corporation, however, may also 
possess sufficient knowledge or experience in the industry of the target so that an equity stake can furnish 
cheaper forms of external capital than other means. Firms facing difficulties in raising capital are more likely 
to sell partial equity stakes to other firms and empirical studies of the U.S. markets by Allen and Phillips 
(2000) and Fee, Hadlock and Thomas (2006) provide support for this idea. Liao (2009) shows that financial 
constraints  are  even  more  important  in  other  countries  and  especially  in  cross-border  partial  equity 
acquisitions. We use several proxy variables for financial constraints including one based on a composite 
index from an intertemporal investment model by Whited and Wu (2006), two proposed by Hadlock and 
Pierce (2008) incorporating firm size, firm age, operating cash flows and leverage (and based on previous 
work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000)), and a simple dummy variable if the firm pays no dividend. In the 
case of the Whited-Wu, and two Hadlock-Pierce variables, we create dummy variables of financial constraints 
for those in the upper quartile of all Worldscope firms. See Table A1 for details on variable construction and 
summary statistics in Table A2. All are computed based on information in the year prior to the deal. Our null 
                                                 
15  See  Kho,  Stulz  and  Warnock  (2009)  for  a  useful  discussion  about  the  problems  and  limitations  associated  with  the 
Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope variable “Closely-held Shares” (Worldscope data item WS08021, see Table A1).   21 
hypothesis specifies that government-controlled acquirers in minority stake or majority control cross-border 
acquisitions are no more likely than corporate acquirers to pursue targets that are financial constrained. 
 
  More Control Variables. Important attributes of a deal can matter. We obtain information from SDC as to 
whether the deal failed or was withdrawn, and in the case of majority control transactions, whether the offer 
was all cash and the fraction of shares in the target the acquirer was after. We also include target firm-specific 
control variables from the year prior to the deal including the (logarithm of) total assets, return on assets, 
leverage (long-term debt to assets), and sales growth (preceding year in real terms).  
 
C.  Deal-Level Results 
The results  of  the  logit  regressions  are  presented  in  Table  4.  We  present  three  model  specifications for 
acquisitions involving minority stakes (Models 1 to 3) and three others for majority control acquisitions (Models4 
to 6). Coefficients are reported as marginal effects, both country and year fixed effects are included, pseudo-R
2 
and the number of observations are presented at the bottom of the table and the standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. With the data constraints that we impose above, our sample of minority acquisition targets 
includes  5,736  observations,  of  which  4.44%  are  government-controlled  acquisitions,  and  that  of  majority 
acquisition targets includes 2,396 observations of which 2.83% are government-controlled acquisitions. The lower 
actual number of observations in each of the specifications is dictated by the combination of explanatory variables 
we choose. 
For  minority  acquisition  stakes,  we  find  that  several  variables  are  statistically  reliable  predictors  of 
government-controlled  relative  to  corporate  acquisitions.  The  zero-dividend  proxy  in  Model  1  for  financial 
constraints is significantly positive coefficient (of 0.015) which implies that government-controlled acquirers are 
more likely to pursue financially-constrained targets. About 47% of target firms do not pay dividends, but we find 
that they are associated with a 1.50% higher likelihood of a government-controlled acquisition, which is sizeable 
compared to the unconditional mean likelihood. The Whited-Wu proxy, which is a dummy variable mostly based 
on low cash flows, low dividend payout, high leverage, low total assets and high past sales growth (about 21% of 
our sample firms are so classified) is also positive and significant in Model 2 (coefficient of 0.012). The Hadlock-
Pierce financial constraint variable in Model 3 is not significant (nor is the simpler variant from Hadlock and 
Pierce (2008) based on just a firm’s size and age). So, there is statistical support for the alternative hypothesis that 
the financing motive emphasized by Allen and Phillips (2001), Fee, Hadlock and Thomas (2006) and Liao (2009), 
but, in economic terms, it is not a large effect.  
The valuation motive, for which we found some support in the previous section on acquisition flows, also 
plays a role in the logit model. In each of the three models, the coefficient on the trailing 12-month market returns 
in the country of the target is significant and negative. The coefficient of  -0.026 implies that a one-standard 
deviation in annual market returns (about 31% on a unconditional mean of 14.5%) is less likely to be associated 
with a government-controlled acquirer by 0.81%, which is a smaller effect than those of the financial constraint   22 
proxies. The 12-month trailing exchange rate returns variable is never significant. Again, while we are unable to 
reject the alternative hypothesis that valuation factors matter, the economic effects are small. 
There is no evidence that the contracting motive matters, as the related industry dummy has no explanatory 
power in any specification. In unreported tests, we also found that our dummy variable for the high R&D expense 
industry membership was insignificant.  We also find that the closely-held shares variable has no explanatory 
power. There is no evidence that government-controlled acquirers in cross-border deals are deterred the fact by 
more shares of the target are held closely by institutions or insiders than corporate acquirers. In other tests, we 
replace the closely-held shares variable with the anti-self-dealing country variable with no different outcome, but 
this variable is likely to be hampered by the country fixed effects. 
Among the control variables, there is positive, but weak, evidence that government-controlled acquirers are 
more likely to fail (or be withdrawn) relative to corporate acquirers. Government-controlled acquirers are also 
more likely to be associated with larger target firms, given the positive and significant coefficient on total assets, 
target  firms  with  more  growth  opportunities  (weak  positive  coefficient  on  market-to-book  ratio)  and  faster-
growing targets (positive sales growth coefficient in Models 2 and 3). Overall, the low pseudo-R
2 coefficients in 
these models are noteworthy for any of these alternative hypotheses we examine. They are even more remarkably 
low given that we include country and year fixed effects.   
For the logit models of majority-control transactions in Models 4 to 6, the sample sizes are smaller again by 
half. The Whited-Wu financial constraint dummy variable shows some explanatory power in Models 1 and 3, but 
its economic effect is similar to that for the minority deals. The related-industry dummy for the contracting 
motive is weak and the closely-held shares dummy variable, which we associate with the governance motive, is 
also weak. Interestingly, none of the control variables on the size of the firm, its growth opportunities, or leverage 
seem to explain any variation. We include two variables related to majority control transactions, such as the terms 
of payment and the size of the acquisition stake. It turns out that  cross-border acquisition deals that involve 
majority control in our sample (on average 86% of shares of target acquired) involve exclusively cash and no 
stock 76% of the time. Indeed, government-controlled acquirers are more likely to use cash only, but this again is 
not a large economic effect. The higher pseudo-R
2 for majority control transactions likely arise from the smaller 
sample available to us and likely the greater importance of unobservable country and market conditions factors 
picked up by the country and year fixed effects.  
In Table 5, we perform an additional analysis of the government-controlled acquisitions that are led by SWFs 
and those by other government-controlled entities. That is, the dependent variable equals one if the acquisition is 
led by a SWF and zero, otherwise. We define those which are SWF-led, as discussed above, according to whether 
SDC  identifies  the  acquirer,  or  the  acquirer’s  intermediary  parent,  as  one  of  the  listed  SWFs  on  the  SWF 
Institute’s website.    23 
We believe this is an important exercise because it helps to calibrate the findings in a number of the recent 
studies of SWF investments. For example, Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009, their Table 9) present a matched-
sample analysis of 76 SWF equity investments in which the benchmark firms are drawn from the same country, 
industry  and  are  similar  in  size  (total  sales), but  are  not  necessarily  the  targets  of  other  similarly-motivated 
entities. They find that SWF’s do not seek out targets with unusual growth opportunities (Tobin’s q ratio) or 
leverage,  but do  so for those  that are  more  financial  constrained  (using  Kaplan  and  Zingales’  (1997,  2000) 
indexes). Fernandes (2009, his Table V) performs cross-sectional regressions of over 7,000 SWF investments - 
though most of which involve very small stakes in the targets (median less than 0.25%) – and finds that there are 
preferences toward larger, more profitable firms and those with lower dividend yields and leverage. But again, he 
benchmarks against the population of all Worldscope firms and not necessarily those that are involved as targets 
of other entities’ acquisitions. Kotter and Lel (2008, their Table 4) present firm characteristics of targets, but they 
do not benchmark them at all, though they are employed in cross-sectional regressions of the share-price reactions 
to the investment announcements.  
We present two sets of tests in Table 5, Models 1 to 3 in which we include targets of government-controlled 
acquirers in the financial services and utilities sectors (they were excluded in Table 4) and Models 4 to 6, in which 
they are excluded. The sample sizes for the latter set of tests drop by half. The variables are identical to those in 
Table 4 with country and year fixed effects, also as before. Several interesting findings arise. First, there is some 
evidence  that  the  financial  constraints  motive  matters.  The  zero  dividend  dummy  is  negative  and  reliably 
significant in Models 1 and 4, though the Whited-Wu and Hadlock-Pierce variables are not in Models 2 or 5 and 3 
or 6, respectively. This implies that SWFs are less likely to pursue financially constrained targets than other 
government-controlled acquirers. More reliable is the related-industry dummy with negative coefficients in each 
of the six model specification. SWFs are less likely to pursue targets in the same industry than other government-
controlled entities. We need to apply caution here as a related-industry definition for the SWFs is the financial 
services sector (with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), but remember that we also associate SWF investments 
in terms of acquirers which are controlled by SWFs as intermediary parents, so there is some integrity to this 
variable when financial services firms are excluded (Models 4 to 6). Whether it relates to the contracting motive 
or not, non-SWF government entities engaged in cross-border deals as acquirers are clearly more likely to be 
influenced by product market considerations. SWF investments are less likely to fail than other government-led 
entities, especially when financial services and utilities sectors are excluded.  
SWFs are more likely to be influenced by market valuations relative to other government-led acquirers. The 
coefficients on trailing 12-month market returns are positive and significant in Models 4 to 6. These findings are 
consistent with the primary inferences in Bernstein, Lerner and Schoar (2009). We offer only weak evidence that 
other firm-specific variables matter, such as size (SWFs more likely to seek out firms with higher total assets in 
Models 2 and 3) and leverage (SWFs more likely to pursue highly-levered targets). Unlike Fernandes (2009) and   24 
Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009), our findings on the importance of these firm-specific variables are very weak. 
We argue then that how one benchmarks these SWF investments does matter. 
 
5.  Market Reactions to Announcements of Cross-Border Deals Led by Government-Controlled Acquirers 
We next examine how shareholders react to the announcements of cross-border deals led by government-
controlled acquirers. As we have done throughout this study, we benchmark the magnitude of these reactions to 
minority  and  majority  stake  acquisitions  led  by  corporate  acquirers.  Under  the  central  null  hypothesis  that 
government-controlled and corporate cross-border acquirers are not different, we predict that the shareholders’ 
reactions to the announcements of such deals should also be indistinguishable. Further, we test a number of 
alternative hypotheses that have been proposed in the literature to try to rationalize the motives for minority and 
majority cross-border acquisitions to give additional power to our approach. The motives are similar to those 
which we presented in previous sections.  
The challenge that we face with this additional analysis is that we need to collect stock returns data from 
Datastream  for  the  sample  of  public  targets  and  this  will  adversely  impact  the  sample  sizes.  For  majority 
acquisitions, our sample of government-controlled and corporate acquirers falls to 3,516 observations and, for 
minority deals, our sample includes 8,361 observations. Financial services and utilities sector target firms are 
excluded.  We  compute  the  cumulative  market-adjusted  returns  for  varying-length  windows  around  deal 
announcements  obtained  from  SDC,  report  the  average  reactions  for  government-controlled  and  corporate 
acquisitions, and perform cross-sectional tests of the reactions using variables that are related to the different 
alternative hypotheses as well as control variables.  
We also do a supplementary analysis of the market reactions to cross-border deal announcements comparing 
those  involving  SWFs  and  other  government-controlled  entities  as  acquirers.  Our  sample  here  includes  490 
observations with financial and utilities sector targets excluded and 954 observations with them included. Our 
goal is again to calibrate the findings in other recent studies of share price reactions of SWF investments, but 
specifically using non-SWF government acquisitions and corporate acquisitions as benchmarks. 
A.  Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns (CMARs) 
To  measure  the  share  price  reactions,  we  compute  cumulative  market-adjusted  buy-and-hold  returns 
(CMARs)  over  three  different  windows  around  the  deal  announcements:  21  days  (from  10  days  before 
announcement to 10 days after, denoted “(-10, +10)”), 11 days (“(-5, +5)”), and 3 days (“(-1, +1)”). The market 
index returns are those based on market-capitalization-weighted index for each country from Datastream.  
Table 6 presents summary statistics of the CMARs. In Panel A, we compare the CMARs for government-
controlled and corporate led cross-border acquisitions separately for minority and majority stakes and, in Panel B, 
we do so for the SWF and non-SWF government-controlled acquisitions for target samples separately that include 
and exclude financial services and utilities sectors. The means and medians and the numbers of observations are   25 
presented for each of the three investment windows around deal announcements. We also report the p-values 
associated with paired two-tailed t-statistics for tests of the differences of the means and Wilcoxon rank-sum z-
statistics for differences in the medians between the comparisons of interest. 
For majority acquisitions, the target firm’s CMARs for our sample of corporate acquirers in majority control 
transactions average around 26% for the 21-day window and 16%, for the 3-day window. Both of these means are 
statistically significantly different from zero. The sample is skewed significantly by some large positive reactions 
as the equivalent median returns are 12% and 6%, respectively. Both medians are also statistically significantly 
different from zero based on Wilcoxon-rank-sum tests. The sizes of these reactions are comparable to those in 
other recent studies of cross-border mergers. For example, in Bris and Cabolis (2008) for their sample of 420 
target firms, they find a positive and statistically significant 14% cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for a 5-day 
window and a further 11% CAR for up to 10 days following the announcement window. Starks and Wei (2004) 
report a statistically-significant 28.24% CAR for their 11-day window in cross-border mergers. When we cull out 
the government-controlled acquirers, we find CMARs of 21% for the 21-day window and 12% for the 3-day 
window. The equivalent medians are also smaller in magnitude at 11% and 2%, respectively. These are somewhat 
smaller than for the corporate-led acquisitions, but in each case, the p-values for the tests on the means and 
medians reject that they are different.  
We also examine a larger sample of minority stake acquisitions. The corporate cross-border acquisitions 
average 17% for the 21-day window and only 6% for the 3-day window; the associated median reactions are 
smaller at only 4% and 1.4% for the respective windows. Again, we can compare these reactions to other studies. 
Kang and Kim (2008) find 9% CARs in their out-of-state partial equity acquisitions and Allen and Phillips (2000) 
uncover a 6.9% reaction for their full sample of minority block acquisitions. Both studies use long windows (close 
to 21-day horizon) but focus on U.S. firms and domestic transactions only. Liao (2009) compares minority block 
acquisitions that are domestic and cross-border around the world and finds that her 4,780 domestic deals (in 49 
countries around the world) have an average CMAR of 8.7% for a 21-day horizon and 7.42% for her 1.851 cross-
border deals. The CMARs in our minority-stake sample involving government-controlled acquirers are smaller 
than the corporate deals and, at least for the longer windows around announcement, significantly so. Reactions are 
only 8.5% for the 21-day window on average (1.99% median), both of which are half as large as for the corporate 
acquisitions. Both p-values for mean and median differences are significant. The comparisons for the 11-day and 
3-day horizons also show the reactions to government-controlled acquirers are more muted, but these simple 
differences are typically not significant.  
In Panel B, we perform the same kind of comparisons of market reactions to government-controlled cross-
border acquisitions, but this time compare those led by SWFs to those led by non-SWF government-controlled 
entities. Whether financial services or utilities targets are included or not, the differences are large and significant 
statistically. On average, reactions to SWF acquisitions are only 1.41% for the 3-day horizon and 0.69% for the   26 
21-day horizons; the equivalent reactions to non-SWF acquisition announcements are 8.05% and 12.52%. The 
magnitude of the differences in medians is smaller (0.88% for SWFs versus 1.32% for non-SWFs in the 3-day 
window, for example, with p-value of 10% in this case), but the differences are larger for longer horizons, even 
with medians. The magnitude of the reactions to SWF acquisitions when financial services and utilities targets are 
included are larger (1.52% for 3-day horizon compared to only 1.41%), but almost all of our inferences comparing 
reactions to SWFs and to non-SWFs remain.  
By comparing the share price reactions of SWF investment announcements to those of non-SWF government-
controlled  acquisitions,  we  get  a  very  different  perspective  than  from  those  of  other  recent  studies  of  SWF 
investments.  For  example,  Fotak,  Bortolotti,  Megginson  and  Miracky  (2009,  their  Table  7,  Panel  B)  find  a 
statistically significant average CMAR of 0.46% (0.81% on volatility-adjusted basis) for the equivalent 3-day 
window for their 212 SWF investment announcements. Kotter and Lel (2008, their Table 3) find 3-day CARs of 
2.15% for their sample of 163 SWF investment announcements. Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009, Table 7) find 
an average 0.82% CAR for a 5-day horizon around their 89 investment announcements.
16 What we learn is that 
these reactions, though reliably positive (which we acknowledge as important), are actually smaller than what one 
might expect if comparing to those of other non -SWF government-controlled acquirers and corporate-led cross-
border acquisitions. Of course, in both sets of comparisons (government-controlled versus corporate deals or SWF 
versus  non-SWF  government-controlled  deals),  it  is  important  to  ascertain  whether  these  reactions  are 
significantly different even after controlling for a variety of country-level, deal- and firm-specific factors. 
B.  Cross-Sectional Test Results 
Table 7 reports results from cross-sectional regressions of the 21-day CMARs of cross-border acquisition 
announcements on country-level and firm-specific variables. These variables are the same as what we included in 
our logit models in the previous section and we line them up with the various hypotheses that have been put 
forward to motivate such deals. In each of the model specifications in Panel A, we include a dummy variable for 
those which are government-controlled acquirers. In Panel B, the sample includes only the government-controlled 
acquirers and each specification here includes a dummy variable for those involving SWFs. These models are 
estimated with ordinary least squares and robust standard errors for the coefficients are computed with corrections 
for heteroscedasticity. We include year fixed effects in all specifications. 
In Model 1 of Panel A, we confirm the finding in Table 6 that CMARs of government-controlled acquirers 
are indistinguishably different from those of corporate acquirers, though this time with robust standard errors and 
year  fixed  effects.  In  each  of  the  additional  specifications  that  we  consider  (Models  2  to  9)  with  different 
combinations of control variables, this finding does not change. The next four models evaluate individual proxies 
                                                 
16 None of the studies by Fotak, Bertolotti, Megginson and Miracky (2009), Kotter and Lel (2008) or Chhaochharia and 
Laeven (2009) indicate how many of the announcements are associated with cross-border acquisitions and which are only 
domestic by the SWFs, so a direct comparison is difficult.   27 
for high industry R&D expenses associated with the contracting motive and for financial constraints associated 
with  the  financing  motive.  These  specifications  have  varying  impact  on  the  number  of  observations  in  the 
regressions, but typically reduce it by 30%. Firms with high R&D expenses are not associated with different 
market reactions. As in the logit regression results of Table 4, the zero-dividend and Hadlock-Pierce dummy 
variables have explanatory power, while the Whited-Wu dummy does not. Firms with greater financial constraints 
that are targets of cross-border acquisition are associated with a statistically-significant and economically-large 
additional 3.7% or 8.2%, which is about 10% and 20%, respectively, of the unconditional standard deviation of 
21-day CMARs. In Models 6 to 9, we retain the zero-dividend dummy and in three of those models, it remains 
positive and statistically significant though its magnitude varies somewhat.  
We also include additional variables in those four models associated with the governance and valuation 
motives outlined in the previous section. We see that target firms with a higher fraction of shares closely-held by 
institutions and insiders do not experience different market reactions, but the coefficients on the anti-self-dealing 
index (ASDI) of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer (2008) are positive, statistically reliable and 
economically large. The average country score on ASDI is 0.61 and its cross-sectional standard deviation is 0.24. 
A one-standard deviation higher ASDI score (going from a low to high legal protection country) is associated 
with a  3.6% higher 21-day CMARs around a cross-border acquisition announcement, which is still sizeable 
relative to the unconditional mean CMAR of 9.6%. The trailing 12-month market returns for the target firm have 
no explanatory power. Among the control variables, total assets, return on assets and market-to-book ratios have 
negative coefficients, so larger, more profitable target firms with more growth options are associated with lower 
CMARs, all else being equal.  
Overall,  we  confirm  that  targets  in  cross-border  acquisitions  involving  government-controlled  acquirers 
experience no different market reactions to their announcements than those involving corporate acquirers. The 
finding is robust to a number of control variables, some of which have useful explanatory power for the cross-
section of CMARs. Generally, the explanatory power of the models we investigate is quite low (around 2%). 
In  Panel  B,  we  examine  only  the  sample  of  cross-border  acquisitions  involving  government-controlled 
acquirers  and  include  in  each  model  specification  a  dummy  variable  for  SWF  acquirers.  The  number  of 
observations average around 800 events, but are as few as 236 in our largest model specification (Model 9). 
Several results are noteworthy. First, the early indication in Table 6 that market reactions to SWF-led acquisitions 
are lower than those for other government-controlled acquirers is confirmed here and in a way that is robust to 
inclusion of almost all combinations of control variables. The coefficient on the SWF acquirer dummy averages 
around -0.06 and is statistically significant for each except Model 8. A 6% lower CMAR in this sample is 
economically large relative to the unconditional mean of around 7.8% and represents about 22% of the cross-
sectional standard deviation in CMARs for this smaller set of observations (about 28%). Second, there is some 
empirical  support  for  the  financing  and  governance  motives  in  this  sample  of  only  government-controlled   28 
acquirers. The coefficient on the Hadlock-Pierce financial constraint dummy variables is positive and significant, 
but those for the other two financing motive proxies are not. In three of four models with the ASDI variable, the 
coefficient is statistically significant and averages around 18%. A one-standard deviation higher ASDI score is 
associated with a 5% higher CMAR in this sample of government-led cross-border acquisitions, a much higher 
level of sensitivity than for the broader sample that includes the corporate acquirers. The closely-held shares 
dummy variable again has no predictive power. In this smaller sample of government-led acquirers, we also find 
no evidence that the contracting motive (through the high R&D expense dummy) or valuation motive (12-month 
market returns) matter. Among the control variables, we find that larger target firms (total assets) and those with 
higher growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio) are associated with lower CMARs, as in the larger sample 
with corporate acquirers, but the magnitude and precision of these relationships are much weaker.
17 
The key finding in these regressions is that, though SWF cross-border investments are indeed associated with 
positive and statistically significant market reactions (in Table 6), they are actually much smaller than those of 
other government-controlled acquirers and corporate acquirers. The differences are economically large and robust 
to many different control variables that seek to capture different possible motives for initiating such transactions.  
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we examine the motives for and consequences of 5,317 failed and completed cross-border 
acquisitions constituting $619 billion of total activity that was led by government-controlled acquirers over the 
period from 1990 to 2008. We benchmark this activity at the aggregate country level and also at the deal-specific 
level relative to cross-border acquisitions involving corporate acquirers over the same period and uncover several 
important findings.  
First, we test whether the cross-country determinants of cross-border acquisition activity are different for 
government-controlled and corporate acquirers and find that government-led deals are relatively more intense for 
geographically-closer countries, but also relatively less sensitive to the level of financial development of the 
acquirer’s home country, the quality of its legal institutions and accounting standards, and to how stringent are 
restrictions on FDI flows in their country. Overall, however, we find that the differences in the determinants of the 
two types of acquisition flows are economically small.  
Second, we examine whether firm-specific and country-level attributes of the target firms have any different 
influence on the likelihood of a cross-border acquisition led by a government-controlled than a corporate acquirer. 
                                                 
17 Among the SWF studies that measure market reactions to their investment announcements, Kotter and Lel (2008, their 
Table 5) provide some useful comparisons for our findings. They find in their sample of 124 investments that target firm 
characteristics have little or no explanatory power compared to those associated with the type of SWFs (level of transparency 
and governance, per Truman (2007) scoring index). Only the level of institutional ownership is associated with higher 2-day 
CARs, but the economic magnitudes are difficult to determine. They show that whether target firms’ market reactions are not 
affected by the legal environment, but those from better developed markets (market capitalization to GDP ratio) experience 
higher CARs. The explanatory power of their models is high (around 50%) but they also include industry controls.   29 
We uncover some evidence that government-led acquirers are more likely to pursue larger targets with greater 
growth opportunities and more financial constraints, but the overall explanatory power of these tests are generally 
quite low. We are able to reject a number of alternative hypotheses related to product-market relationships, 
financial constraints, corporate governance, or market-timing motives for such acquisitions that might allow us to 
differentiate government-led and corporate-led acquisitions. When we examine only the subset of deals involving 
government-controlled acquirers that involve sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and benchmark them, in turn, by 
those  led  by  other  non-SWF  government-controlled  agencies  and  corporations,  however,  we  do  find  some 
differences. SWF-led acquisitions are less likely to fail and they are more likely to pursue acquirers that are larger 
in total assets and with fewer financial constraints.  
Thirdly, we show that the cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMARs) around announcements of cross-
border acquisitions led by government-controlled and corporate acquirers are large, positive (median reaction 
around 6% for a 3-day announcement-day window) and indistinguishably different for the two types. This result 
holds up even when we control for different possible motives for such acquisitions based on country-level, deal- 
and target firm-specific attributes. An important difference in market reactions we do find, however, is between 
government-controlled  acquisitions  led  by  SWFs  and  those  of  other  government  agencies.  Though  both  are 
positive  and  statistically  significant  reactions,  the  CMARs  for  SWF-led  acquisitions  are  statistically  and 
economically much smaller and these differences also hold up in cross-sectional regressions that control for a 
variety of country-level and target firm-specific attributes.  
These findings are important not only because of the large and growing amount of cross-border acquisition 
activity that involves government-controlled acquirers, but also because of the heightened regulatory concern 
about such deals in many countries around the world. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 
in the U.S. has instituted much tougher scrutiny of potential foreign acquirers that involve a government entity, 
and similar legislation is in place or forthcoming in China, Australia and Germany, among many other countries. 
Our findings suggest that these concerns may be unwarranted for most government-led acquisitions.  Greater 
attention on SWFs as a particular type of acquirer may indeed be worthy of further scrutiny, but the vast majority 
of government-led foreign acquirers in terms of deal count and cumulative value of deal activity appears to be 
motivated  no  differently  than  corporate-led  cross-border  deals  and  the  economic  consequences  appear  to  be 
indistinguishably different.  
Our study also makes an important contribution to the literature on the operational and financial performance 
of state-owned enterprises. A number of scholars have argued why and how government firms are less efficient or 
less profitable due to the natural conflicts that arise from self-interested politicians and bureaucrats and there is 
considerable  evidence  that  government-controlled  firms  are  indeed  associated  with  poorer  operational  and 
financial  performance.  Our  study  involves  a  special  experiment  to  examine  these  questions  that  focuses  on 
transactions in which the target firm becomes, at least partially, a state-owned enterprise. We exploit a natural   30 
benchmark in terms of corporate-led deal activity and also existing theoretical and empirical research that guides 
us to different possible motives for such transactions. These motives furnish testable alternative hypotheses to the 
null hypothesis that acquisitions by government-led and corporate acquirers are not different and thus allow us 
more powerful tests. We also offer an important new perspective on findings in the recent growing literature 
focused on SWF acquisitions by benchmarking their decisions and outcomes relative to acquisitions led by other 
government-controlled entities. We find that the attributes and characteristics of targets and SWFs are somewhat 
different and, though the market reactions are positive to SWF investment announcements (as other studies have 
shown), they are significantly smaller than those associated with other government-controlled acquirers.   
There are still many open questions. We readily admit that there are several possible alternative explanations 
for government-led acquisitions that we have not yet considered. For example, we have not yet tried to identify 
characteristics of the different types of government agencies that represented these acquirers. We have also not 
tried to separate out the types of SWFs by governance and transparency attributes, as the other studies of SWFs 
have done. Our study only examines the short-term reactions to these government-controlled acquirers. Indeed, 
there are likely important longer-term operational and financial consequences from their newly-acquired stakes 
and even in terms of financial investment returns and risks from the perspectives of the acquirers.  Another form 
of analysis that we have largely ignored is at the policy level. A number of countries have instituted rules and 
legislation for foreign investment reviews and we have not evaluated what, if any, are the consequences of those 
rule changes for cross-country acquisition activity or for terms and conditions at the deal level. Finally, we have 
not evaluated any positive or negative externalities of cross-border government-led deal activity for other social 
and economic objectives. After all, decision-makers that influence the government-controlled acquirers that we 
study likely have a broader set of concerns than which targets are chosen and how shareholders react to their 
announcement. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics. 
This  table  presents  summary  statistics  on  cross-border  block  acquisitions  involving  at  least  a  5%  stake  in  the  target 
corporation announced during the period of 1990 to 2008.  The data are obtained from Thomson Reuter’s Security Data 
Corporation’s  (SDC)  Platinum  Mergers  and  Corporate Transactions  database.  We  exclude  leveraged  buyouts,  spin-offs, 
recapitalizations,  self-tender  offers,  exchange  offers,  repurchases  and  privatizations  and  deals  in  which  acquirers  are 
domiciled in overseas territories of the U.K. (Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man) and 
the Netherlands (Netherland Antilles). The acquirer’s ultimate parent public status is used to identify government controlled 
acquirers,  which  is  defined  as  at  least  50%  cash  flow  ownership.  We  collect  announcement  dates,  their  public  status, 
percentage of shares acquired, the medium of payment, open market or private negotiation, premium paid. By year, we report 
the total number of deals, the subset with disclosed values, the average deal value (measured in millions of constant US 
dollars as of 2000), the cumulative deal value, the number of failed or withdrawn deals, the number involving minority stakes 
(less than 50%), the number involving a financial acquirer (including a sovereign wealth funds and those with SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999), and the number of publicly-traded target firms. 
 
Year  Total 
No.of Deals 








Deal Value  
(Constant 2000 
US$ millions) 
No. of  
Failed  
Deals 
No. of  
Minority 
Acquisitions 
No. of  
Financial 
Acquirers 
No. of  
Public  
Targets 
                   
Panel A: Government-Controlled Acquirers   
1990  214  84  $ 441  $ 37,082  72  118  42  102   
1991  256  77  $ 171  $ 13,198  83  158  64  94   
1992  209  59  $ 118  $ 6,976  57  112  49  79   
1993  223  78  $ 121  $ 9,418  88  157  68  98   
1994  212  73  $ 43  $ 3,146  66  139  57  81   
1995  209  69  $ 96  $ 6,649  68  126  45  68   
1996  207  72  $ 145  $ 10,432  65  126  40  72   
1997  238  123  $ 166  $ 20,421  60  156  67  106   
1998  222  91  $ 280  $ 25,502  66  128  55  96   
1999  295  110  $ 278  $ 30,533  70  164  43  93   
2000  388  168  $ 194  $ 32,632  104  200  73  141   
2001  302  140  $ 193  $ 27,015  97  157  49  117   
2002  250  136  $ 230  $ 31,269  70  132  58  95   
2003  281  125  $ 110  $ 13,796  102  150  66  114   
2004  285  127  $ 150  $ 19,067  113  171  82  106   
2005  319  157  $ 356  $ 55,920  108  173  101  120   
2006  321  149  $ 320  $ 47,616  127  190  102  125   
2007  436  203  $ 543  $ 110,208  194  285  136  186   
2008  450  208  $ 572  $ 119,006  202  294  143  202   
                   
Total  5,317  1,812  $ 238  $ 619,886  1,926  3,353  1,434  2,261   
                   
Panel B: Corporate Acquirers   
1990  3,501  1,613  $ 134  $ 216,797  731  1,488  800  1,287   
1991  4,124  1,537  $ 69  $ 105,328  1,031  1,905  935  1,460   
1992  3,761  1,459  $ 76  $ 111,269  943  1,669  866  1,458   
1993  4,249  1,702  $ 74  $ 126,407  1,136  1,965  924  1,560   
1994  5,307  2,142  $ 76  $ 163,753  1,374  2,545  1,227  1,854   
1995  6,309  2,476  $ 99  $ 244,657  1,561  2,732  1,372  2,153   
1996  6,700  2,714  $ 107  $ 291,619  1,534  2,763  1,394  2,309   
1997  7,198  3,151  $ 124  $ 391,184  1,374  2,571  1,539  2,448   
1998  8,634  3,696  $ 183  $ 675,740  1,854  3,133  1,830  2,923   
1999  10,024  4,152  $ 311  $ 1,289,934  2,135  3,836  2,197  3,412   
2000  12,110  5,139  $ 209  $ 1,076,562  2,904  5,000  2,548  3,996   
2001  9,029  3,727  $ 142  $ 527,995  2,256  3,591  1,971  3,307   
2002  6,981  3,080  $ 97  $ 297,468  1,919  2,811  1,700  2,741   
2003  7,377  3,224  $ 87  $ 279,079  2,140  3,157  2,034  3,052   
2004  8,244  3,883  $ 118  $ 456,499  2,254  3,325  2,219  2,877   
2005  9,492  4,439  $ 144  $ 640,520  2,237  3,327  2,592  3,138   
2006  11,507  5,372  $ 172  $ 926,168  3,309  4,665  3,234  3,700   
2007  13,631  6,395  $ 241  $ 1,541,320  4,252  6,088  4,177  4,011   
2008  12,201  5,317  $ 137  $ 726,242  4,075  5,900  3,401  3,686   
                   
Total  150,379  69,877  $ 137  $ 10,088,541  39,019  62,471  36,960  17,845   
                   38 
 
Table 2. Intensity of Cross-Border Acquisition Activity Led by Government-Controlled Acquirers by Country of Acquirers and Targets. 
This table presents the number of deals and the cumulative deal value (in 2000 Constant US$ millions) of cross-border block acquisitions led by government-controlled and 
corporate acquirers involving at least a 5% stake in the target corporation announced over the period from 1990 to 2008. The data are obtained from Thomson Reuter’s Security 
Data Corporation’s (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Corporate Transactions database. We exclude leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers, 
repurchases and privatizations and deals in which acquirers are domiciled in overseas territories of the U.K. (Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of 
Man) and the Netherlands (Netherland Antilles). We exclude countries in which there are fewer than 50 cross-border acquisitions, whether led by government-controlled or 
corporate acquirers, over the 1990-2008 period. The acquirer’s ultimate parent public status is used to identify government controlled acquirers, which is defined as at least 50% 
cash flow ownership. The results are reported by country in order of the fraction of total cumulative deal value that government-led acquirers comprise for leading  acquirer 
countries (Panel A) and for the leading target countries (Panel B).   
 
Panel A:  By Acquirer Country    Panel B: By Target Country 
          Number of Deals  Cumulative Deal Value  
(2000 Constant US$ millions)              Number of Deals  Cumulative Deal Value  
(2000 Constant US$ millions) 
Acquirer   Govt  Corp  Fraction  Govt  Corp  Fraction    Target  Govt  Corp  Fraction  Govt  Corp  Fraction 
Venezuela  28  38  47.4%  $2,068  $354  85.4%    UAE  6  219  2.7%  $2,613  $3,324  44.0% 
UAE  185  204  48.0%  $66,902  $20,101  76.9%    Hong Kong  583  3053  16.0%  $66,138  $100,921  39.6% 
China  833  841  38.8%  $114,224  $45,240  71.6%    Malaysia  57  1519  3.6%  $6,435  $25,335  20.3% 
Saudi Arabia  37  170  50.2%  $23,149  $9,906  70.0%    Finland  75  1790  4.0%  $12,277  $49,270  19.9% 
Czech Republic  20  100  17.4%  $2,007  $932  68.3%    Slovak Rep  21  307  6.4%  $1,040  $4,307  19.5% 
Kazakhstan  8  35  16.7%  $1,297  $687  65.4%    Egypt  88  1224  6.7%  $7,426  $36,556  16.9% 
Kuwait  58  136  17.8%  $14,177  $8,693  62.0%    Indonesia  32  224  12.5%  $4,764  $23,626  16.8% 
Singapore  390  3109  11.2%  $68,865  $84,881  44.8%    Kazakhstan  22  184  10.7%  $2,238  $13,422  14.3% 
Colombia  4  47  18.8%  $876  $1,296  40.3%    Argentina  40  1555  2.5%  $10,997  $81,016  12.0% 
Estonia  6  26  7.4%  $84  $126  40.0%    Taiwan  21  726  2.8%  $3,012  $24,814  10.8% 
Qatar  28  37  43.1%  $8,834  $21,917  28.7%    Austria  63  1400  4.3%  $4,869  $40,658  10.7% 
Norway  280  1638  15.0%  $21,138  $55,915  27.4%    Singapore  61  2133  2.8%  $7,597  $66,060  10.3% 
Liechtenstein  4  47  9.1%  $470  $1,781  20.9%    Hungary  73  979  6.9%  $3,187  $28,536  10.0% 
Portugal  47  470  10.8%  $6,946  $26,627  20.7%    Thailand  81  1880  4.1%  $10,139  $97,934  9.4% 
Thailand  21  270  3.7%  $946  $4,810  16.4%    Norway  64  1239  4.9%  $2,352  $22,799  9.3% 
Malaysia  79  2119  7.2%  $10,869  $57,390  15.9%    Russian Fed.  56  1558  3.5%  $6,948  $70,119  9.0% 
Finland  241  1754  12.6%  $12,495  $70,088  15.1%    Spain  218  6145  3.4%  $27,366  $289,329  8.6% 
Poland  19  168  10.2%  $478  $2,804  14.6%    Australia  5  44  10.2%  $107  $1,223  8.0% 
Chile  7  153  4.3%  $643  $4,642  12.2%    Bahrain  140  3875  3.5%  $23,800  $284,771  7.7% 
Sweden  202  4333  9.1%  $21,404  $164,585  11.5%    Ireland Rep.  4  79  4.8%  $61  $746  7.6% 
France  717  8164  4.3%  $93,687  $839,185  10.0%    Saudi Arabia  88  1732  4.8%  $5,136  $63,077  7.5% 
Slovenia  12  44  21.4%  $45  $460  8.8%    Denmark  31  1182  2.6%  $3,348  $42,373  7.3% 
India  49  1285  4.7%  $4,326  $48,471  8.2%    Sweden  58  2569  2.2%  $11,644  $152,085  7.1% 
Italy  122  2821  3.7%  $22,441  $267,016  7.8%    Italy  164  3899  4.0%  $23,218  $313,220  6.9% 
Japan  46  5357  9.0%  $21,393  $266,348  7.4%    Switzerland  13  377  3.3%  $2,049  $28,248  6.8% 
Austria  132  1416  2.5%  $3,480  $46,174  7.0%    Greece  9  238  3.6%  $3,067  $43,905  6.5% 
South Korea  31  723  4.1%  $2,226  $34,686  6.0%    Mexico  27  1700  1.6%  $5,817  $84,162  6.5% 
Taiwan  16  641  0.8%  $992  $16,778  5.6%    India  115  3162  3.5%  $4,931  $78,099  5.9% 
Brazil  33  310  10.2%  $3,462  $58,825  5.6%    Bermuda  36  1416  2.5%  $3,362  $53,447  5.9% 
Croatia  1  29  3.3%  $21  $374  5.3%    Portugal  192  3200  5.7%  $11,857  $205,102  5.5% 
Hong Kong  2  4135  7.0%  $4,898  $105,403  4.4%    South Africa  383  13743  2.7%  $91,205  $1,638,613  5.3% 
Denmark  24  2019  0.0%  $2,093  $52,415  3.8%    Colombia  29  846  3.3%  $1,534  $30,228  4.8% 
Others  1077  97912  1.1%  $55,792  $7,503,019  0.7%    Others  1904  76354  2.4%  $222,191  $5,824,602  3.7% 
All  4759  140551  3.3%  $592,725  $9,821,927  5.7%    All  4759  140551  3.3%  $592,725  $9,821,927  5.7% 39 
 
Table 3. Cross-Country Determinants of Cross-Border Acquisition Activity Led by Government-Controlled Acquirers.  
This table presents cross-sectional regressions of country-level determinants on the cumulative number (or deal value in constant 2000 US$ millions) of cross-border block 
acquisition deals led by government-controlled or corporate acquirers from country i in a target corporation in country j announced over the period from 1990 to 2008.  The 
dependent variable is the cumulative number (or value) of deals between country i and j divided by the total number (value) of all deals involving acquirers in country i (Panel A) 
or all those involving targets in country j (Panel B). See Table 1 for data sources, identification of type of acquirer and exclusions by type of deal. We exclude activity between 
country pairs (i,j)  in which there are fewer than 50 (30) cross-border acquisition deals involving  corporate and government-controlled (government-controlled only) acquirers 
over the 1990-2008 period. Models 1 to 10 include only government-controlled acquirers, Models 11 to 14, only corporate acquirers, and Model 15 is the ratio of the fraction of 
deals led by government-controlled acquirers between countries i and j per all government acquirers from country i relative to the fraction of deals led by corporate acquirers 
between countries i and j per all corporate acquirers from country i. Models 8 and 12 measure activity by the cumulative total constant-dollar deal activity, Models 9 and 13 
consider only those minority stake deals that involve between 5% and 50% block purchases in targets and Models 10 and 14 consider only deals with majority stakes (greater than 
50% of target shares). See Table A1 for details on variable construction and Table A2 for summary statistics. 
***, 
**, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels using robust standard errors and associated t-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficients. 
 
Panel A: By Acquirer Country 
  Government-Controlled Acquirers Only  Corporate Acquirers Only  Ratio 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
             
Total 
No. of  
Deals 
Total 









No. of  
Deals 
Total 











Average Annual Exchange Rate Return Differences  -0.028** 
         
-0.007  0.051**  -0.020  0.022  0.014  0.049**  0.010  0.019  -0.022 
  (-2.07) 
         
(-0.35)  (2.03)  (-0.79)  (0.93)  (1.00)  (2.29)  (0.72)  (1.30)  (-1.38) 
Average Annual Real Stock Market Return Differences  0.039 
         
0.057*  0.060  0.040  0.050  0.047*  0.069*  0.037  0.056**  0.011 
  (1.43) 
         
(1.71)  (1.38)  (1.09)  (1.15)  (1.88)  (1.93)  (1.52)  (2.11)  (0.41) 
Average Log GDP per capita Differences 
 
-0.003*** 
       
-0.003*  -0.007***  -0.002  -0.006***  -0.004***  -0.007***  -0.003**  -0.005***  0.001 
   
(-3.17) 
       
(-1.79)  (-2.82)  (-1.07)  (-3.35)  (-3.01)  (-4.50)  (-2.30)  (-3.52)  (0.69) 
Average  GDP Growth Differences 
 
0.080* 
       
-0.017  -0.058  0.011  -0.101  -0.074  -0.076  -0.096*  -0.052  0.058 
   
(1.90) 
       
(-0.21)  (-0.56)  (0.13)  (-1.36)  (-1.42)  (-1.17)  (-1.91)  (-0.94)  (0.93) 
Geographic Proximity 
   
0.004*** 
     
0.004***  0.003***  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***  0.003***  0.004***  0.004***  0.000 
     
(6.35) 
     
(6.74)  (4.11)  (6.11)  (6.20)  (8.33)  (4.37)  (8.20)  (7.88)  (0.64) 
Market Correlation 
   
0.076*** 
     
0.092***  0.104***  0.084***  0.097***  0.099***  0.117***  0.088***  0.107***  -0.007 
     
(5.16) 
     
(5.46)  (4.61)  (4.82)  (5.28)  (7.83)  (7.87)  (7.43)  (7.90)  (-0.64) 
Anti-Self Dealing Index Differences 
     
0.001 
                             
(0.21) 
                      Accounting Disclosure Index Differences 
     
-0.038** 
                             
(-2.55) 
                      PolityIV Democracy Differences 
       
-0.005 
                             
(-0.78) 
                    FDI Restrictiveness Target 
       
-0.129*** 
                             
(-2.59) 
                    European Union Dummy 
         
0.027**  -0.007  -0.013  -0.004  -0.020**  -0.013*  -0.025***  -0.012*  -0.014*  0.006 
           
(2.57)  (-0.62)  (-1.02)  (-0.30)  (-2.50)  (-1.95)  (-3.98)  (-1.84)  (-1.94)  (0.56) 
Tax Haven Dummy Target 
         
-0.012***  -0.025***  -0.025***  -0.024*** -0.030***  -0.019***  -0.025***  -0.017***  -0.020***  -0.007* 
           
(-3.60)  (-4.89)  (-3.52)  (-4.25)  (-5.29)  (-4.50)  (-5.89)  (-4.12)  (-4.62)  (-1.93) 
Constant  0.024***  0.023***  0.016*** 0.027***  0.059***  0.021***  0.014**  0.006  0.016***  0.014**  0.010***  0.001  0.014***  0.008**  0.004 
  (12.73)  (13.82)  (2.61)  (11.42)  (6.48)  (13.65)  (2.56)  (0.75)  (2.66)  (2.24)  (2.81)  (0.21)  (3.80)  (1.98)  (0.89) 
Observations  1640  1980  1640  1122  552  2352  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482 
Adjusted R-squared  0.00  0.01  0.06  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.08  0.05  0.07  0.08  0.15  0.10  0.14  0.15  0.00 40 
 
Table 3. Cross-Country Determinants of Cross-Border Acquisition Activity Led by Government-Controlled Acquirers. (continued) 
 
Panel B: By Target Country 
  Government-Controlled Acquirers Only  Corporate Acquirers Only  Ratio 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
             
Total 
No. of  
Deals 
Total 









No. of  
Deals 
Total 











Average Annual Exchange Rate Return Differences  0.065*** 
         
0.090***  0.084***  0.088***  0.092***  0.022  0.033**  0.024*  0.021  0.068*** 
  (6.97) 
         
(4.71)  (2.84)  (4.40)  (4.11)  (1.59)  (1.99)  (1.74)  (1.49)  (3.16) 
Average Annual Real Stock Market Return Differences  0.075*** 
         
0.117***  0.039  0.100***  0.144***  -0.083***  -0.081***  -0.087***  -0.079***  0.200*** 
  (3.13) 
         
(3.89)  (0.81)  (3.27)  (4.29)  (-3.42)  (-2.73)  (-3.55)  (-3.24)  (6.32) 
Average Log GDP per capita Differences 
 
0.002** 
       
0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.001  0.006***  0.006***  0.006***  0.007***  -0.006*** 
   
(2.05) 
       
(0.17)  (0.10)  (-0.21)  (0.46)  (4.65)  (3.94)  (4.38)  (4.86)  (-3.11) 
Average  GDP Growth Differences 
 
0.134*** 
       
0.140**  0.188*  0.127*  0.165**  -0.003  -0.049  -0.016  0.007  0.143* 
   
(2.88) 
       
(2.09)  (1.87)  (1.75)  (2.37)  (-0.06)  (-0.84)  (-0.30)  (0.13)  (1.84) 
Geographic Proximity 
   
0.004*** 
     
0.004***  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.001** 
     
(9.18) 
     
(7.96)  (4.92)  (7.50)  (7.63)  (7.03)  (5.13)  (7.13)  (6.70)  (1.98) 
Market Correlation 
   
0.060*** 
     
0.063***  0.066***  0.060***  0.064***  0.101***  0.100***  0.098***  0.103***  -0.038** 
     
(4.87) 
     
(4.55)  (4.04)  (4.44)  (4.10)  (7.70)  (7.37)  (7.66)  (7.75)  (-2.40) 
Anti-Self Dealing Index Differences 
     
-0.010** 
                             
(-2.00) 
                      Accounting Disclosure Index Differences 
     
0.057*** 
                             
(5.24) 
                      PolityIV Democracy Differences 
       
-0.012*** 
                             
(-3.20) 
                    FDI Restrictiveness Acquirer 
       
-0.205*** 
                             
(-4.51) 
                    European Union Dummy 
         
0.044***  0.014  -0.001  0.017  0.013  -0.012*  -0.004  -0.010  -0.013**  0.026*** 
           
(4.02)  (1.27)  (-0.05)  (1.41)  (1.12)  (-1.87)  (-0.45)  (-1.46)  (-2.07)  (2.69) 
Tax Haven Dummy Acquirer 
         
-0.003  -0.016***  -0.004  -0.015**  -0.019***  -0.019***  -0.021***  -0.017***  -0.021***  0.003 
           
(-0.50)  (-2.73)  (-0.35)  (-2.49)  (-2.72)  (-4.85)  (-4.90)  (-4.33)  (-5.22)  (0.50) 
Constant  0.023***  0.021***  0.024***  0.023***  0.068***  0.019***  0.022***  0.017***  0.022***  0.024***  0.008**  0.006  0.008**  0.007*  0.015*** 
  (13.96)  (14.51)  (5.89)  (11.91)  (7.02)  (14.57)  (4.95)  (2.76)  (4.61)  (4.58)  (1.97)  (1.22)  (2.09)  (1.83)  (2.99) 
Observations  1640  1980  1640  1122  552  2352  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482 
Adjusted R-squared  0.02  0.00  0.08  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.11  0.05  0.10  0.10  0.16  0.13  0.16  0.15  0.06 
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Analysis of Probability of Firm Targeted by Government-Controlled Acquirer.  
This table presents logistic regressions of the probability that a firm is targeted by a government-controlled acquirer in a given year. 
The dependent variable equals one if the firm is targeted by a government-controlled acquirer in any given year between 1990 and 
2008 and zero, if it is targeted by a corporation. Financials and utilities as target firms are excluded as are firms with total assets 
smaller  than  US$1  million  (in  2000  constant  dollars)  and  with  negative  book  values  of  equity.  See  Table  1  for  data  sources, 
identification of type of acquirer and exclusions by type of deal. Models 1 to 3 present results for minority stake acquisitions (above 
5% but below 50% of target firm’s shares acquired) and Models 4 to 6, for majority control transactions (above 50% of target firm’s 
shares acquired). Firm variables include a dummy variable indicating whether target and acquirer firms are in the same industry 
(“Related Industry Dummy”), three proxies for firm financial constraints (“Zero-dividend Dummy,” “High Whited and Wu Index,” 
“High Hadlock and Pierce Index II”), a proxy for high levels of closely-held share by insiders (“High Closely-held Share Dummy”), 
the cumulative 12-month market and U.S. dollar exchange-rate returns for the domicile of the target (“12-month Market Returns,” 
“12-month Exchange Rate Returns,” respectively), log of total assets (“Total Assets”), profitability (“Return on Assets”), leverage 
(“Long-term Debt’Assets”), a dummy variable for withdrawn or failed deals (“Failed Deals Dummy”) and trailing one-year sales 
growth (“Sales Growth”). For majority-stake acquisitions, two deal-level variables are included: a dummy variable for deals paid 
entirely in cash (“All Cash Payment Dummy”) and percentage of shares owned by acquirer (“Percentage of Shares Acquired”). See 




* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels using robust standard errors that allow country and year fixed 
effects and associated t-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficients. 
 
  Minority Stake Acquisitions  Majority Stake Acquisitions 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Related Industry Dummy  -0.003  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003 
  (-0.67)  (-0.82)  (-0.95)  (-0.80)  (-0.74)  (-0.60) 
Failed Deals Dummy  0.009*  0.009*  0.009*  0.005  0.006  0.004 
  (1.89)  (1.86)  (1.87)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.24) 
Zero-dividend Dummy  0.015*** 
            (2.60) 




0.013*  0.008  0.013* 
   
(2.14) 
 
(1.70)  (0.91)  (1.67) 
High Hadlock and Pierce Index II 
   
0.014 
           
(1.43) 
      All Cash Payment Dummy 
       
0.013** 
           
(2.19) 
  Percentage of Shares Acquired 
         
-0.000 
           
(-1.53) 
High Closely-held Shares Dummy  -0.005  -0.006  -0.006  -0.001  -0.003  0.000 
  (-0.99)  (-1.20)  (-1.13)  (-0.11)  (-0.50)  (0.03) 
12-month Market Returns  -0.026**  -0.025**  -0.025**  0.015  -0.012  0.013 
  (-2.05)  (-2.07)  (-2.04)  (0.95)  (-0.58)  (0.88) 
12-month Exchange Rate Returns  0.011  0.004  0.004  -0.041  -0.021  -0.042 
  (0.33)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (-1.15)  (-0.43)  (-1.20) 
Total Assets (log)  0.009***  0.008***  0.009***  0.003  0.003  0.003* 
  (6.47)  (6.24)  (5.97)  (1.61)  (1.22)  (1.70) 
Market-to-book  0.002*  0.002*  0.002*  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (1.93)  (1.81)  (1.77)  (0.80)  (1.06)  (0.76) 
Return on Assets  0.000  -0.002  0.001  -0.008  -0.007  -0.008 
  (0.04)  (-0.29)  (0.07)  (-1.50)  (-0.85)  (-1.48) 
Long-term Debt/Assets  0.003  0.006  -0.001  -0.003  -0.018  -0.002 
  (0.24)  (0.41)  (-0.04)  (-0.14)  (-0.72)  (-0.10) 
Sales Growth  0.003  0.004*  0.004**  -0.000  0.003  -0.000 
  (1.59)  (1.87)  (2.08)  (-0.05)  (1.17)  (-0.13) 
              Country fixed effects?  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year fixed effects?  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
              Observations  3175  3320  3320  1384  914  1384 
Pseudo R-squared  0.151  0.145  0.143  0.270  0.263  0.276 
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Table 5. Logistic Regression Analysis of Probability of Firm Targeted by Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) as Acquirer.  
This table presents logistic regressions of the probability that a firm is targeted by a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) as one type of 
government-controlled acquirer in a given year. The dependent variable equals one if the firm is targeted by a SWF in any given year 
between 1990 and 2008, and zero if it is targeted by any other type of government-controlled acquirer. Firms with total assets less than 
US$1  million  (in  2000  constant  dollars)  and  with  negative  book  values  of  equity  are  excluded.  See  Table  1  for  data  sources, 
identification of type of acquirer and exclusions by type of deal. Models 1 to 3 present results with financial services and utilities firms 
included and Models 4 to 6, those in which they are excluded. We only include non-SWF led acquisitions by government-controlled 
firms that involve minority stake acquisitions (above 5% but below 50% of target firm’s shares acquired). Firm variables include a 
dummy variable indicating whether target and acquirer firms are in the same industry (“Related Industry”), three proxies for firm 
financial constraints (“Zero-dividend Dummy,” “High Whited and Wu Index,” “High Hadlock and Pierce Index II”), a proxy for high 
levels  of  closely-held  share  by  insiders  (“High  Closely-held  Share  Dummy”),  the  cumulative  12-month  market  and  U.S.  dollar 
exchange rate returns for the domicile of the target (“12-month Market Returns,” “12-month Exchange Rate Returns,” respectively), 
log of total assets (“Total Assets”), profitability (“Return on Assets”), leverage (“Long-term Debt’Assets”), a dummy variable for 
withdrawn or failed deals (“Failed Deals Dummy”) and trailing one-year sales growth (“Sales Growth”). See Table A1 for details on 
variable construction and Table A2 for summary statistics. Coefficients are reported as marginal effects. 
***, 
**, and 
* denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels using robust standard errors that allow country and year fixed effects and associated t-
statistics are in parentheses below the coefficients. 
 
  Financial Services and Utilities Included  Financial Services and Utilities Excluded 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Related Industry Dummy  -1.313***  -1.252***  -1.238***  -1.286*  -1.132*  -1.154* 
  (-2.93)  (-2.86)  (-2.83)  (-1.77)  (-1.75)  (-1.80) 
Failed Deals Dummy  -0.606  -0.813*  -0.812*  -1.339**  -1.244**  -1.249** 
  (-1.43)  (-1.96)  (-1.95)  (-2.00)  (-2.07)  (-2.08) 
Zero-dividend Dummy  -1.201** 
   
-2.632*** 
      (-2.43) 
   
(-3.25) 
    High Whited and Wu Index 
 
0.197 
   
-0.086 
     
(0.43) 
   
(-0.13) 
  High Hadlock and Pierce Index II 
   
0.469 
   
-0.365 
     
(0.67) 
   
(-0.41) 
High Closely-held Shares Dummy  -0.886*  -0.800  -0.836*  -0.788  -0.872  -0.836 
  (-1.71)  (-1.58)  (-1.65)  (-1.06)  (-1.31)  (-1.24) 
12-month Market Returns  1.071  0.575  0.623  4.426**  2.852*  2.867* 
  (1.02)  (0.58)  (0.63)  (2.12)  (1.67)  (1.68) 
12-month Exchange Rate Returns  -0.562  -1.068  -1.252  4.550  -0.457  -0.418 
  (-0.20)  (-0.39)  (-0.45)  (0.73)  (-0.08)  (-0.08) 
Total Assets (log)  0.135  0.235**  0.273**  -0.089  0.159  0.120 
  (1.14)  (2.05)  (2.12)  (-0.44)  (0.89)  (0.59) 
Market-to-book  -0.197  -0.288  -0.296  -0.042  -0.138  -0.131 
  (-0.97)  (-1.33)  (-1.37)  (-0.15)  (-0.56)  (-0.55) 
Return on Assets  0.003  0.012  0.013  -0.001  0.009  0.008 
  (0.34)  (0.94)  (1.02)  (-0.05)  (0.64)  (0.52) 
Long-term Debt/Assets  0.972  0.092  -0.082  4.773**  1.068  1.278 
  (0.81)  (0.08)  (-0.07)  (2.09)  (0.61)  (0.70) 
Sales Growth  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.002  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.58)  (0.31)  (0.24)  (0.88)  (-0.20)  (-0.24) 
              Country fixed effects?  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year fixed effects?  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
              Observations  296  310  310  156  161  161 
Pseudo R-squared  0.377  0.363  0.364  0.416  0.341  0.342 
 43 
 
Table  6.  Cumulative  Market-Adjusted  Returns  (CMARs)  to  Announcements  of  Cross-Border  Acquisitions  Led  by 
Government-Controlled Acquirers, including Sovereign Wealth Funds, and Corporate Acquirers.  
This table reports the cumulative market adjusted buy-and-hold returns (CMARs) in percentage around the announcement dates of 
cross-border acquisitions led by government-controlled and corporate acquirers. See Table 1 for data sources, identification of type of 
acquirer  and  exclusions  by  type  of  deal.  Buy-and-hold  returns  are  cumulated  over  three  different  returns  horizons  around  the 
announcement date (t=0), including from days t=-10 to t=+10 (“CMARs(-10,+10)”), days t=-5 to t=+5 (“CMARs(-5,+5)”), and days 
t=-1 to t=+1 (“CMARs(-1,+1)”). In Panel A, results are reported separately for acquisitions that involve a minority stake in the target 
firm (more than 5% but less than 50% of shares) and a majority stake (greater than 50% of shares). Financial services and utilities 
target firms are excluded. In Panel B, differences in means and medians in CMARs are reported between government-led acquisitions 
that involve sovereign wealth funds (SWF) as acquirers and those that do not. A SWF is identified as a financial acquirer in Securities 
Data Corporation under ACQUIROR_TYPE data item and matched by name (SDC data item AN) to a list of SWFs at the SWF 
Institute  website,  http://www.swfinstitute.org/funds.php).  Mean  and  median  values  are  reported  with  p-values  for  the  t-statistics 
associated  with  differences  in  means  and  Wilcoxon  rank-sum  tests  associated  with  differences  in  medians  between  groups  are 
presented in parentheses. 
***, 
**, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A: Government-Controlled versus Corporate Cross-border Acquisitions 




 (-10, +10) 
CMARs 
 (-5, +5) 
CMARs 
 (-1, +1) 
Differences in Means 
         
Majority Stakes 
Corporate acquirer  3,431  25.67%**  19.87%**  15.76%** 
Government acquirer  85  20.71%**  18.35%**  11.56%** 
Diff (p-value) 
 
(0.38)  (0.69)  (0.13) 
           
 Minority Stakes 
Corporate acquirer  7,956  16.86%**  13.27%**  5.34%*** 
Government acquirer  405  8.49%***  7.26%***  6.02%*** 
Diff (p-value) 
 
(0.09)  (0.20)  (0.59) 
            Differences in Medians 
         
Majority Stakes 
Corporate acquirer  3,431  11.72%**  9.37%***  5.79%*** 
Government acquirer  85  10.58%**  6.41%***  2.09%*** 
Diff (p-value) 
 
(0.90)  (0.89)  (0.22) 
           
 Minority Stakes 
Corporate acquirer  7,956  3.76%***  3.17%***  1.41%*** 
Government acquirer  405  1.99%***  1.31%***  1.00%*** 
Diff (p-value) 
 
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.11) 
              
Panel B: Sovereign Wealth Funds versus Other Government-Controlled Acquisitions 




 (-10, +10) 
CMARs 
 (-5, +5) 
CMARs 
 (-1, +1) 
Differences in Means 
          Financial Services and  
Utilities Firms Excluded 
Other Non-SWF Government-Controlled acquirer  413  12.52%**  10.70%**  8.05%*** 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) only  77  0.69%  1.49%  1.41%** 
Diff (p-value) 
 
(<0.01)  (<0.01)  (<0.01) 
            Financial Services and  
Utilities Firms Included 
Other Non-SWF Government-Controlled acquirer  773  8.93%***  7.93%***  6.10%*** 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) only  181  2.73%**  2.01%*  1.52%*** 
Diff (p-value) 
 
(<0.01)  (<0.01)  (<0.01) 
            Differences in Medians 
          Financial Services and  
Utilities Firms Excluded 
Other Non-SWF Government-Controlled acquirer  413  3.76%***  2.58%***  1.32%*** 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) only  77  (0.46%)  (0.03%)  0.88%** 
Diff (p-value) 
 
(<0.01)  (<0.01)  (0.10) 
           
Financial Services and  
Utilities Firms Included 
Other Non-SWF Government-Controlled acquirer  773  2.81%***  2.28%***  1.09%*** 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) only  181  0.60%**  0.72%*  0.85%*** 
Diff (p-value) 
 
(0.03)  (0.01)  (0.22) 
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Table 7. Regression Analysis of Cross-section of Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns (CMARs) to Announcements of Cross-Border Acquisitions Led by Government-
Controlled Acquirers, including Sovereign Wealth Funds, and Corporate Acquirers.  
This table reports  the results for cross-sectional regressions of  cumulative  market adjusted buy-and-hold returns  (CMARs) around the announcement dates of cross-border 
acquisitions led by government-controlled and corporate acquirers on a variety of firm-specific and country-level variables. See Table 1 for data sources, identification of type of 
acquirer and exclusions by type of deal. Buy-and-hold returns are cumulated around the announcement date (t=0) for days t=-10 to t=+10 (“CMARs(-10,+10)”). In Panel A, results 
are reported for acquisitions that involve a minority (more than 5% but less than 50% of shares) of the target firm for acquisitions led by government-controlled and corporate 
acquirers. Financial services and utilities target firms are excluded.  Panel B presents results for only acquisitions (involving minority or majority stakes above 50% in the target) 
led by government-controlled acquirers, including those of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs, denoted “SWF Acquirer Dummy”). Financial services and utilities firms are included in 
these regressions. See Table 5 for identification of SWF acquirers. Firm variable names are defined in Tables 4 and 5 and Table A1 presents details on variable construction and 
Table A2 for summary statistics. We include a variable “High R&D Industry” which is a dummy variable that equals one if the target firm operates in an industry that is in the 
upper quartile of R&D expenditures divided by total net assets among all 4-digit SIC industries in the U.S. on Compustat. Country variables include the Anti-Self Dealing Index of 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008). 
***, 
**, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels using robust standard errors that allow year 
fixed effects and associated t-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficients. 
 
Panel A: CMARs around Acquisition Announcements of All Government-Controlled and Corporate Acquirers 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Government-Controlled Acquirer Dummy  -0.003  0.011  0.001  0.010  0.012  -0.003  0.012  0.006  0.013 
  (-0.17)  (0.52)  (0.03)  (0.45)  (0.58)  (-0.15)  (0.57)  (0.29)  (0.53) 
High R&D Industry Dummy    0.010 
     
0.021  0.021  0.014  0.007 
    (0.68) 
     
(1.18)  (1.19)  (0.80)  (0.45) 
Zero-dividend Dummy      0.037*** 
   
0.034***  -0.002  0.019*  0.026** 
      (2.97) 
   
(2.84)  (-0.17)  (1.77)  (2.16) 
High Whited and Wu Index     
 
0.013 
     
   
     
 
(0.83) 
     
   
High Hadlock and Pierce Index II     
   
0.082*** 
   
   
     
   
(4.03) 
   
   
High Closely-held Shares Dummy     
     
0.010  0.006  0.012  0.018 
     
     
(0.54)  (0.34)  (0.58)  (0.79) 
Ant-Self Dealing Index     
     
0.085***  0.048***  0.078***  0.080*** 
     
     
(5.09)  (2.92)  (4.61)  (4.56) 
12-month Market Returns     
     
-0.022  -0.022  -0.011  -0.013 
     
     
(-1.16)  (-1.18)  (-0.58)  (-0.66) 
Total Assets (log)     
       
-0.019***     
     
       
(-5.24)     
Return on Assets     
         
-0.001**   
     
         
(-2.51)   
Market-to-book     
         
  -0.008*** 
     
         
  (-3.00) 
Long-term Debt/Assets     
         
  -0.047 
     
         
  (-1.40) 
Sales Growth     
         
  0.000 
     
         
  (0.95) 
     
         
   
Year fixed effects?  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
     
         
   
Observations  7351  5531  4487  5531  5531  4309  4302  4070  3592 
Pseudo R-squared  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02 
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Table 7. Regression Analysis of Cross-section of Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns to Announcements of Cross-Border Acquisitions Led by Government-Controlled, 
including Sovereign Wealth Funds, and Corporate Acquirers. (continued) 
 
Panel B: CMARs around Acquisition Announcements of Only Government-Controlled Acquirers 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
SWF Acquirer Dummy  -0.066***  -0.077***  -0.070**  -0.071**  -0.062**  -0.066**  -0.055*  -0.055  -0.081* 
  (-3.88)  (-2.69)  (-2.34)  (-2.42)  (-2.20)  (-1.99)  (-1.75)  (-1.64)  (-1.71) 
High R&D Industry Dummy    0.000 
     
0.038  0.045  0.046  0.039 
    (0.01) 
     
(0.73)  (0.87)  (0.92)  (0.72) 
Zero-dividend Dummy      0.019 
   
0.014  -0.027  -0.016  0.047 
      (0.48) 
   
(0.36)  (-0.62)  (-0.41)  (0.95) 
High Whited and Wu Index     
 
0.043 
     
   
     
 
(0.96) 
     
   
High Hadlock and Pierce Index II     
   
0.152** 
   
   
     
   
(2.52) 
   
   
High Closely-held Shares Dummy     
     
0.072  0.070  0.045  0.072 
     
     
(1.13)  (1.10)  (0.71)  (1.10) 
Ant-Self Dealing Index     
     
0.158**  0.120  0.182**  0.202** 
     
     
(2.09)  (1.62)  (2.53)  (2.52) 
12-month Market Returns     
     
0.115  0.090  0.162*  0.165 
     
     
(1.19)  (0.93)  (1.68)  (1.60) 
Total Assets (log)     
       
-0.022**     
     
       
(-2.31)     
Return on Assets     
         
-0.002   
     
         
(-1.53)   
Market-to-book     
         
  -0.024* 
     
         
  (-1.88) 
Long-term Debt/Assets     
         
  0.210 
     
         
  (0.72) 
Sales Growth     
         
  -0.000 
     
         
  (-0.98) 
     
         
   
Year fixed effects?  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
     
         
   
Observations  839  356  297  356  356  285  285  268  236 




Figure 1. Number of and Total Deal Value of All Cross-Border Acquisitions Led by Government-Controlled Acquirers By Year. 
This figure exhibits the number of and total cumulative deal value (in 2000 Constant US$ millions) of cross-border block acquisitions led by government-controlled involving at 
least a 5% stake in the target corporation announced over the period from 1990 to 2008. The data are obtained from Thomson Reuter’s Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
Platinum  Mergers  and  Corporate  Transactions  database.  We  exclude  leveraged  buyouts,  spin-offs,  recapitalizations,  self-tender  offers,  exchange  offers,  repurchases  and 
privatizations and deals in which acquirers are domiciled in overseas territories of the U.K. (Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man) and the 
Netherlands (Netherland Antilles) and we further exclude countries in which there are fewer than 50 cross-border acquisitions, whether led by government-controlled or corporate 
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Figure 2. Total Deal Value of All Acquisitions Led by Government-Controlled Acquirers by Country of Acquirer and of Target Firms. 
This figure exhibits the cumulative deal value (in 2000 Constant US$ millions) of cross-border block acquisitions led by government-controlled and corporate acquirers involving 
at least a 5% stake in the target corporation announced over the period from 1990 to 2008. The data are obtained from Thomson Reuter’s Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
Platinum  Mergers  and  Corporate  Transactions  database.  We  exclude  leveraged  buyouts,  spin-offs,  recapitalizations,  self-tender  offers,  exchange  offers,  repurchases  and 
privatizations and deals in which acquirers are domiciled in overseas territories of the U.K. (Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man) and the 
Netherlands (Netherland Antilles) and we further exclude countries in which there are fewer than 50 cross-border acquisitions, whether led by government-controlled or corporate 
acquirers, over the 1990-2008 period.  The acquirer’s ultimate parent public status is used to identify government controlled acquirers, which is defined as at least 50% cash flow 
ownership. The results are reported by country in order of total cumulative deal value by government-led acquirers comprise for leading acquirer countries and their target country 
regions (Panel A) and for the leading target countries and the home country region of their acquirers (Panel B). 
 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Total Deal Value of All Acquisitions Led by Government-Controlled Acquirers by Country of Acquirer and of Target Firms. (continued) 
 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1. Variable Definitions. 
Variable  Definition 
   
Government-controlled (corporate) 
acquirer deal ratio between countries i 
and j 
The ratio of the number of deals in which the target is from country i and the acquirer is a government-controlled corporation (non-
government-controlled) from country j (where i ≠ j) to the total number of cross-border deals with government-controlled (non-
government-controlled) acquirers from country j (Source: SDC Mergers and Corporate Transactions database). 
   
Government-controlled (corporate) 
acquirer deal ratio between countries i 
and j (minority stakes only) 
The ratio of the number of minority block acquisitions in which the target is from country i and the acquirer is a government-controlled 
(non-government-controlled) corporation from country j (where i ≠ j) to the total number of cross-border minority block acquisitions 
with government-controlled (non-government-controlled) acquirers from country j (Source: SDC Mergers and Corporate Transactions 
database). 
   
Government-controlled (corporate) 
acquirer deal ratio between countries i 
and j (majority stakes only) 
The ratio of the number of majority control acquisitions in which the target is from country i and the acquirer is a government-controlled 
(non-government-controlled) corporation from country j (where i ≠ j) to the total number of cross-border majority control acquisitions 
with government-controlled (non-government-controlled) acquirers from country j (Source: SDC Mergers and Corporate Transactions 
database) 
 
Average Annual Exchange Rate Return 
Difference 
Difference in the average annual real bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate return from 1990 to 2007 between acquirer and target country. 
We use national exchange rates from Datastream from WM/Reuters. WMR quotes are based on 4:00pm London (Greenwich Mean 
Time).We obtain National Exchange Rates for the U.K. Pound Sterling and manually convert these currency quotes to get the quotes for 
the U.S. dollar. These indices are then deflated using the 2000 constant dollar Consumer Price Index (CPI) to calculate real exchange 
rate returns (in U.S. dollars). 
   
Average Annual Exchange Rate Return 
Acquirer (Target) 
Average annual real bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate return from 1990 to 2007 of the acquirer (target) firm’s country of domicile. See 
above. 
   
Average Annual Real Stock Market 
Return Differences 
Difference in the average annual local real stock market return from 1990 to 2007 between acquirer and target country. We obtain 
country-level stock return indices in local currency (Datastream code: RI) and deflate these indices using the 2000 Constant Price Index 
(CPI) to calculate real stock returns. (Source: Datastream) 
   
Average Annual Real Stock Market 
Return Acquirer (Target) 
The average annual local real stock market return from 1990 to 2007 of the acquirer (target) firm’s country of domicile (Source: 
Datastream). 
 
Average Log GDP per capita 
Differences 
Difference between target and acquirer firm’s country of domicile in the average logarithm of Gross Domestic Product (in US$) divided 
by the average population from 1990 to 2007  (Source: World Bank Development Indicators) 
 
Average Log GDP per capita Acquirer 
(Target) 
The average Gross Domestic Product (in US$) divided by the population of the acquirer (target) firm’s country of domicile from 1990 to 
2007 (Source: World Bank Development Indicators) 
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Variable  Definition 
Average  GDP Growth Differences  The difference between acquirer and target in the average annual real growth rate of the gross domestic product from 1990 to 2007 
(Source: World Bank Development Indicators) 
   
Average  GDP Growth Acquirer 
(Target)  
The average annual real growth rate of the gross domestic product of the acquirer (target) country from 1990 to 2007 (Source: World 
Bank Development Indicators) 
   
   
Accounting Disclosure Index 
Differences 
The difference between acquirer and target in the index created by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research to rate 
the quality of 1990 annual reports on their disclosure of accounting information (Source: LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997, 1998)). 
   
Accounting Disclosure Index Acquirer 
(Target) 
The index created by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research to rate the quality of 1990 annual reports on their 
disclosure of accounting information of the acquirer (target) firm’s country of domicile (Source: LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997, 1998)). 
   
Anti-Self Dealing Index Differences  The difference between acquirer and target in the anti-self dealing index (Source: Djankov,La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2008)).  
   
Anti-Self Dealing Index Acquirer 
(Target) 
The anti-self dealing index of the acquirer (target) firm’s country of domicile (Source: Djankov,La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2008)).  
   
Geographic Proximity  The negative of the great circle distance between the capitals of countries i and j. We obtain latitude and longitude of capital cities of 
each country. We then apply the standard formula: 3963.0 * arcos [sin(lat1) *  sin(lat2) + cos (lat1) * cos (lat2) * cos (lon2 - lon1)], 
where lon and lat are the longitudes and latitudes of the acquirer (“1” suffix) and the target country (“2” suffix) locations, respectively. 
(Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com/utilities/world-latitude-longitude.htm) 
   
Market Correlation  The correlation coefficient using monthly country-level stock index returns denominated in US dollars (Datastream code: RI) from 
Datastream between 1990 and 2000. 
   
PolityIV Democracy Differences  The difference between acquirer and target in the measure of regime democracy and/or autocracy, ranging from -10 (high autocracy) and 
+10 (high democracy). The PolityIV Project is led by Monty Marshall (George Mason University), Keith Jaggers (Colorado State) and 
was founded originally by Ted Robert Gurr (University of Maryland) (Source: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm ) 
   
PolityIV Democracy Acquirer (Target)  The measure of regime democracy and/or autocracy, ranging from -10 (high autocracy) and +10 (high democracy) of the acquirer 
(target) firm’s country of domicile (Source: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). 
   
FDI Restrictiveness Differences  The difference between acquirer and target in the proxy that quantifies discrimination against foreign firms regarding right of 
establishment, ranging from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive) (Source: Golub (2003)). 
   
FDI Restrictiveness Acquirer (Target)  The proxy that quantifies discrimination against foreign firms regarding right of establishment, ranging from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 
(most restrictive) of the acquirer (target) firm’s country of domicile (Source: Golub (2003)) 
   51 
 
Variable  Definition 
European Union Dummy  Equals 1 if both target and acquirer belongs to the European Union 
   
Tax Haven Dummy Target (Acquirer)  Equals 1 if the target (acquirer) country is classified as an “offshore financial center” (OFC) by International Monetary Fund’s definition 
(Source: IMF Background Paper, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, June 23, 2000, List of Countries, Territories and 
Jurisdictions with OFCs at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm#table1)  
   
Bilateral Trade (Annual)  Value of imports by target firm’s country of domicile from acquirer firm’s country of domicile as a percentage of total imports by target 
country by year (Source: http://comtrade.un.org/db/) 
   
Developed Country Dummy  Equals 1 for developed countries (Source: Standard & Poor’s Emerging Market Database) 
   
Government Acquirer dummy  Equals 1 if acquirer's ultimate parent is ultimately controlled by government and 0 otherwise (Source: SDC Mergers and Corporate 
Transactions database). 
   
Related Industry Dummy  Equals 1 if the target firm’s Standard Industrial Code (SIC) overlaps with that of the acquirer at three-digit level (Source: SDC Mergers 
and Corporate Transactions database). 
   
All Cash Payment Dummy  Equals 1 if the deal is 100% paid in cash and 0 otherwise; when the payment is unknown, it is set to missing (Source: SDC Mergers and 
Corporate Transactions database). 
   
Failed Deals Dummy  Equals 1 if the deal is announced but not completed (Source: SDC Mergers and Corporate Transactions database). 
   
Percent of Shares Acquired  The percentage of shares of the target ultimately owned by the acquirer (Source: SDC Mergers and Corporate Transactions database). 
   
Total Assets (log)  Book value of total assets in millions of constant 2000 US dollars (Source: WORLDSCOPE item WC07230) 
   
Return on Assets  (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense on Debt - Interest Capitalized ) * (1-Tax Rate))) / Average of Last Year's 
and Current Year's (Total Capital + Last Year's Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long Term Debt) * 100 (WORLDSCOPE item 
WC08376) 
   
Market-to-Book  (Book value of total assets (WORLDSCOPE item WC02999)-book value of equity (WC05491*WC05301)+ market value of equity 
(WC08001))/book value of assets (WC02999) 
   
Long-term Debt/Assets  Ratio of long-term debt to book value of assets (WORLDSCOPE items WC03251/WC02999) 
   
Sales Growth  One-year local country CPI inflation-adjusted sales growth (WORLDSCOPE item WC01001) 
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Variable  Definition 
12-month Stock Market Returns  12-month cumulative real stock returns in US dollars at the country level. We obtain country-level stock return indices in US dollars 
from Datastream (Datastream code: RI) and deflate these indices using the 2000 Constant Price Index (CPI) to calculate real stock 
returns for the trailing 12-month period up to the target acquisition announcement..  
   
High R&D Industry  Equals 1 if the firm operates in the upper quartile of R&D expenditures divided by total net assets among all 4-digit SIC industries on 
Compustat. (Source: WORLDSCOPE item 07021) 
   
Zero-dividend dummy  Equals 1 if the firm pays no dividends (Source: WORLDSCOPE item WC04551) 
   
High Whited and Wu Index  Equals 1 if the firm's Whited and Wu (WW, 2006) index is in the upper quartile of all WORLDSCOPE firms. We calculate for each firm 
WW index as -.091*EBITDA (WC18198/WC02999)-0.062*Positive Dividend Dummy (WC04551) +0.02*Long-term debt ratio 
(WC03251/WC02999)-0.04*log of total assets (WC02999)+0.102*Industry sales growth (WC01001). 
   
High HP2 Index  Equals 1 if the firm's Hadlock and Pierce (HP, 2008) size, age, operating cash flows, and leverage index is in the upper quartile of all 
WORLDSCOPE firms. The index is constructed for each firm as HP2=-0.352*log of total assets (WC02999)-0.025*age (calendar year-
WC18273)-0.584*EBITDA (WC18198/WC02999 )+1.747*Long-term debt (WC03251/WC02999 ) 
    
DKLMS High Flexibility Index  Equals 1 if the firm's Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller and Stulz (DKLMS, 2009) financial flexibility index equals to 0 or 1; The index 
ranges from 0 to 3 and is constructed as a count variable by adding one point for a firm with high cash and liquid assets 
(WC02001/WC02501), one point for high dividend (WC04551/WC02501), and one point for low capital expenditures 
(WC04601/WC02501). A firm is classified as having high cash and liquid assets if its cash and liquidity asset holdings are in the upper 
quartile of all firms within their country. A similar rule is applied to both dividends and capital expenditures. 
   
High Closely-Held Shares Dummy  Equals 1 if the firm's insider ownership is in the upper quartile of all WORLDSCOPE firms (WC08021) 
   
SWF Acquirer Dummy  Equals 1 if the firm is targeted by a sovereign wealth fund (SWF); 0 if the firm is targeted by a non-SWF government acquirer (Source: 
SDC and SWF institute website, fund identified as financial acquirer in Securities Data Corporation under ACQUIROR_TYPE data item 
and matched by name AN to list of SWFs at  http://www.swfinstitute.org/funds.php) 
   
Minority Block Acquisition Dummy  Equals 1 if the deal is a minority block purchase (less than 50% of target firm’s shares) and 0 if the deal is majority control acquisition  
(Source: SDC Mergers and Corporate Transactions database) 
   
CARs (-10, +10), CARs (-5, +5), 
CARs (-1, +1) 
Market-adjusted cumulative returns for the (-10, +10) interval centered around announcement date (Source: SDC Mergers and Corporate 
Transactions database and Datastream). Similar for (-5,+5) day and (-1,+1) day intervals around announcement date. 
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Table A2. Summary Statistics on Variables. 
Tables  Variables  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Table 3             
  Government-controlled acquirer deal ratio between countries i and j  2,352  0.021  0.070  0.000  1.000 
  Government-controlled acquirer dollar ratio between countries i and j  2,352  0.020  0.094  0.000  1.000 
  Government-controlled acquirer deal ratio between countries i and j (minority stakes only)  2,352  0.021  0.075  0.000  1.000 
  Government-controlled acquirer deal ratio between countries i and j (majority stakes only)  2,352  0.020  0.078  0.000  1.000 
  Corporate acquirer deal ratio between countries i and j  2,352  0.021  0.051  0.000  0.621 
  Corporate acquirer dollar ratio between countries i and j  2,352  0.021  0.068  0.000  0.725 
  Corporate acquirer deal ratio between countries i and j (minority stakes only)  2,352  0.021  0.050  0.000  0.553 
  Corporate acquirer deal ratio between countries i and j (majority stakes only)  2,352  0.021  0.055  0.000  0.669 
  (Government deal ratio - Corporate deal ratio)  2,352  0.000  0.053  -0.438  0.967 
             
  Average Annual Exchange Rate Return Difference  1,640  0.000  0.128  -0.346  0.346 
  Average Annual Real Stock Market Return Differences  1,640  0.000  0.058  -0.200  0.200 
  Average Log GDP per capita Differences  1,980  0.000  1.680  -4.562  4.562 
  Average  GDP Growth Differences  2,070  0.000  0.031  -0.108  0.108 
  Geographic Proximity  2,256  -4.472  3.034  -12.351  -0.062 
  Market Correlation  1,640  0.343  0.163  -0.081  0.781 
  Anti-Self Dealing Index Differences  1,260  0.000  0.363  -0.908  0.908 
  Accounting Disclosure Index Differences  1,122  0.000  0.179  -0.590  0.590 
  PolityIV Democracy Differences  1,722  0.000  6.897  -20.000  20.000 
  FDI Restrictiveness Acquirer (Target)  552  0.174  0.073  0.064  0.352 
  European Union Dummy  2,352  0.047  0.211  0.000  1.000 
  Tax Haven Dummy Target (Acquirer)  2,352  0.102  0.303  0.000  1.000 
Table 4             
  Government Acquirer dummy (Minority Deals)  5,736  0.044  0.206  0.000  1.000 
  Government Acquirer dummy (Majority Deals)  2,396  0.028  0.166  0.000  1.000 
  Related Industry Dummy  5,715  0.332  0.471  0.000  1.000 
  Zero-dividend dummy  4,521  0.471  0.499  0.000  1.000 
  High Whited and Wu Index  5,736  0.210  0.408  0.000  1.000 
  High HP2 Index  5,736  0.204  0.403  0.000  1.000 
  High Closely-Held Shares Dummy  5,736  0.140  0.347  0.000  1.000 
  Anti-Self Dealing Index (target)  5,427  0.624  0.234  0.092  1.000 
  12-month Stock Market Returns  5,616  0.181  0.306  -0.838  2.934 
  Total Assets (log)  4,798  5.253  2.087  -1.961  10.093 
  Market-to-Book  4,602  1.996  2.318  0.401  29.603 
  Return on Assets  4,507  -0.036  0.386  -3.403  0.613 
  Long-term Debt/Assets  4,793  0.136  0.160  0.000  0.837 
  Sales Growth  4,155  0.304  0.925  -0.772  7.462 
  Failed Deals Dummy  5,736  0.418  0.493  0.000  1.000 
  Average Annual Exchange Rate Return (target)  5,731  0.008  0.114  -0.825  0.291 
Table 5             
  SWF Acquirer Dummy(Financials and Utilities excluded)  628  0.185  0.388  0.000  1.000 
  SWF Acquirer Dummy (Financials and Utilities included)  922  0.211  0.409  0.000  1.000 
  Related Industry Dummy  880  0.407  0.492  0.000  1.000 
  Zero-dividend dummy  585  0.403  0.491  0.000  1.000 
  High Whited and Wu Index  751  0.237  0.426  0.000  1.000 
  High HP2 Index  751  0.138  0.346  0.000  1.000 
  High Closely-Held Shares Dummy  751  0.144  0.351  0.000  1.000 
  12-month Stock Market Returns  722  0.196  0.316  -0.722  1.558 
  Total Assets (log)  611  6.741  2.400  0.573  11.391 
  Market-to-Book  554  1.874  2.213  0.392  21.665 
  Return on Assets  550  0.020  0.299  -2.671  0.641 
  Long-term Debt/Assets  611  0.175  0.185  0.000  0.889 
  Sales Growth  512  0.419  1.191  -0.772  7.462 
  Failed Deals Dummy  922  0.443  0.497  0.000  1.000 
  Average Annual Exchange Rate Return (target)  812  -0.003  0.107  -0.650  0.291 




              Tables  Variables  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
              7 (Panel A)  CAR (-10, +10)  7,351  0.096  0.428  -0.912  10.671 
  Government Acquirer dummy  8,374  0.048  0.215  0.000  1.000 
  High R&D Industry  5,668  0.247  0.431  0.000  1.000 
  Zero-dividend dummy  4,600  0.461  0.499  0.000  1.000 
  High Whited and Wu Index  5,668  0.212  0.409  0.000  1.000 
  High HP2 Index  5,668  0.199  0.400  0.000  1.000 
  High Closely-Held Shares Dummy  5,668  0.141  0.348  0.000  1.000 
  Anti-Self Dealing Index (target)  5,398  0.622  0.237  0.092  1.000 
  12-month Stock Market Returns  5,560  0.175  0.305  -0.722  2.934 
  Total Assets (log)  4,871  5.324  2.101  -1.961  10.093 
  Return on Assets  4,596  -0.039  0.381  -3.403  0.613 
  Market-to-Book  4,697  1.957  2.239  0.401  29.603 
  Long-term Debt/Assets  4,867  0.138  0.160  0.000  0.837 
  Sales Growth  4,220  0.284  0.886  -0.772  7.462 
              7 (Panel B)  CAR (-10, +10)  839  0.078  0.276  -0.756  2.635 
  SWF Acquirer Dummy  954  0.190  0.392  0.000  1.000 
  High R&D Industry  363  0.209  0.407  0.000  1.000 
  Zero-dividend dummy  303  0.512  0.501  0.000  1.000 
  High Whited and Wu Index  363  0.298  0.458  0.000  1.000 
  High HP2 Index  363  0.207  0.405  0.000  1.000 
  High Closely-Held Shares Dummy  363  0.152  0.359  0.000  1.000 
  Anti-Self Dealing Index (target)  348  0.707  0.249  0.172  1.000 
  12-month Stock Market Returns  360  0.188  0.288  -0.625  1.480 
  Total Assets (log)  311  5.744  2.193  0.573  10.093 
  Return on Assets  292  -0.001  0.334  -3.403  0.545 
  Market-to-Book  302  2.150  3.019  0.515  29.603 
  Long-term Debt/Assets  311  0.137  0.153  0.000  0.834 
  Sales Growth  264  0.387  1.107  -0.772  6.714 
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